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“There’s a man who leads a life of danger 
To everyone he meets he stays a stranger 
With every move he makes another chance he takes 
Odds are he won’t live to see tomorrow
Secret agent man, secret agent man
They’ve given you a number and taken away your name”1 
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.  A.B., Harvard College 
(1983); J.D., Harvard Law School (1986).  Thanks to Dean Alfred A. Aman and Dean 
Bernard V. Keenan for their continued support. 
 1. JOHNNY RIVERS, Secret Agent Man, on GOLDEN HITS (Imperial Records 1966)
(Lyrics by P.F. Sloan and S. Barri).  The song was the theme for the television show
Secret Agent and was released as a single in 1966.  See Secret Agent Man by Johnny 
Rivers, SONGFACTS, http://www.songfacts.com/detail.php?id=4352 (last visited July 21,
2010); The Hits, JOHNNY RIVERS, http://www.johnnyrivers.com/jr/hits.html (last visited 
July 21, 2010). 
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Fiction, particularly fiction whose subject is crime and its detection, 
can be a rich source of insight into cultural attitudes toward law.2 
Detective fiction, genred though it is,3 while always taking as its 
narrative subject the detection and punishment of crime, continually 
reinvents itself as cultural norms evolve.  A comparison of the nineteenth 
century tales of Edgar Allan Poe4 and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle5 with 
those of midcentury Raymond Chandler6 and late century García
2. See generally DENNIS PORTER, THE PURSUIT OF CRIME: ART AND IDEOLOGY IN
DETECTIVE FICTION 1 (1981) (“The importance of popular works resides in their status as 
meaning-systems that embody implicit world views.”).
3. Much has been written about whether detective fiction deserves to be 
considered critically, or whether it is, by nature of its popular appeal, unworthy of
scholarly attention. See, e.g., id. at 5 (“[T]here is an art of the detective novel that is not 
necessarily synonymous with literary art in Edmund Wilson’s sense.”); JULIAN SYMONS, 
BLOODY MURDER: FROM THE DETECTIVE STORY TO THE CRIME NOVEL: A HISTORY 25 
(Viking 1985) (1972) (noting that critics of the detective novel “are so delighted by
puzzles and problems that they confuse the undoubted interest such things possess with
that of literature,” but also acknowledging that “the best crime stories are novels of 
quality”); EDMUND WILSON, CLASSICS AND COMMERCIALS: A LITERARY CHRONICLE OF 
THE FORTIES 263 (1950) (“[T]he reading of detective stories is simply a kind of vice that, 
for silliness and minor harmfulness, ranks somewhere between smoking and crossword
puzzles.”), quoted in  DAVID LEHMAN, THE PERFECT MURDER: A STUDY IN DETECTION
181 (1989). 
4. See, e.g., EDGAR ALLAN POE, The Murders in the Rue Morgue, in  TALES OF
EDGAR ALLAN POE 50 (1944) (introducing his detective, C. Auguste Dupin, who deduces
through pure reason the extraordinary nature of the crime and criminal involved in a 
brutal murder in Paris); see also SYMONS, supra note 3, at 39 (noting that “Dupin is able 
to interpret the thoughts of his companion by the way in which he reacts to exterior
events like being pushed aside by a fruiterer carrying a basket on his head,” and that
“[h]e solves the problems presented to him by pure analytic deduction”). 
5. See, e.g., SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE SIGN OF FOUR (1890), reprinted in 1 
THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 97, 126 (Barnes & Noble, Inc. 2003) (quoting Conan 
Doyle’s detective, Sherlock Holmes, as explaining, “[W]hen you have eliminated the 
impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth”); see also
SYMONS, supra note 3, at 21 (noting that crime literature in the era of Conan Doyle
offered to readers “a reassuring world in which those who tried to disturb the established
order were always discovered and punished,” and that “[b]ehind the conscious Victorian 
and Edwardian adherence to a firmly fixed hierarchical society there lay a deep vein of 
unease about the possible violent overturn of that society”). 
6. See, e.g., RAYMOND CHANDLER, THE BIG SLEEP (Vintage Books 1992) (1939)
[hereinafter CHANDLER, THE BIG SLEEP] (following a detective, Philip Marlowe, who 
punches and shoots his way through an investigation involving the psychopathic 
daughter of his client); see also RAYMOND CHANDLER, The Simple Art of Murder, in THE
SIMPLE ART OF MURDER 1, 18 (Vintage Books 1988) (1950) [hereinafter CHANDLER, The
Simple Art] (describing the hard-boiled or noir aesthetic: “down these mean streets a
man must go who is not himself mean, who is neither tarnished nor afraid”); SYMONS, 
supra note 3, at 22 (“[By 1939] [t]he social and religious structure of society had
changed so much that its assumptions seemed preposterous.”).
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Márquez7 makes this plain. Everything from the nature and causes of 
crime,8 to the role of public and private police in its detection and
punishment,9 to the possibility or likelihood of determining the truth of a
7. See  GABRIEL GARCÍA MÁRQUEZ, CHRONICLE OF A DEATH FORETOLD (Gregory
Rabassa trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1983) (1981) (following a nameless detective-
narrator who describes a killing and its perpetrators on the first pages, only to conclude 
by the narrative’s end that the facts surrounding the murder are uncertain); see also
Rosanna Cavallaro, Solution to Dissolution: Detective Fiction from Wilkie Collins to 
Gabriel García Márquez, 15 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 27 (2005) (contending that García 
Márquez’s novella “challenges each of a series of aspects of the legal process through its
systematic deconstruction of the paradigmatic detective story”).
8. In the detective fiction of Conan Doyle, and later Agatha Christie, crime is the 
product of individual vice. See, e.g., LEHMAN, supra note 3, at 110 (noting that in the 
classic detective novel, “[c]rime is to chaos as detection is to order,” and that with the 
“unmasking of the villain . . . the violation of decorum . . . has been isolated, and now the 
little community can pick up where it left off”).  But the fiction of the so-called hard-
boiled era later depicts crime as a byproduct of larger social forces. See, e.g., PORTER, 
supra note 2, at 40 (noting that in the fiction of Dashiell Hammett, “[t]he initial crime 
often turns out to be a relatively superficial symptom of an evil whose magnitude and 
ubiquity are only progressively disclosed during the course of the investigation”); 
CHESTER HIMES, COTTON COMES TO HARLEM 14 (Buccaneer Books 1993) (1965)
(“[Detective Grave Digger Jones explains to his partner,] ‘We got the highest crime rate 
on earth among the colored people in Harlem.  And there ain’t but three things to do
about it: Make the criminals pay for it—you don’t want to do that; pay the people 
enough to live decently—you ain’t going to do that; so all that’s left is let ‘em eat one 
another up’”); MÁRQUEZ, supra note 7 (describing a community in which gender roles 
and social expectations associated with those roles force an “honor killing” of a bride’s
supposed lover by her brothers); Cavallaro, supra note 7, at 37 (“García Márquez 
challenges the paradigm of the whodunnit by distributing moral, if not legal, 
responsibility for the murders across a broad class of persons—nearly the entire town.”). 
9. Some of the earliest detective fiction arose in an era when larger communities 
like Paris and London were first employing and professionalizing a police force.  See
STEPHEN KNIGHT, CRIME FICTION 1800–2000: DETECTION, DEATH, DIVERSITY 30–32 
(2004) (discussing the rise of the “New Police” in England); see also Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004) (“England did not have a professional police force 
until the 19th century . . . .”).  The private detectives who are the protagonists of those
narratives often appear as idiosyncratic geniuses, able to extract meaning from artifacts 
and clues that leave these new professionals befuddled, or worse, misled to erroneous 
conclusions.  See, e.g., AGATHA CHRISTIE, THE MYSTERIOUS AFFAIR AT STYLES 366–71
(1975) (portraying Detective Poirot as able to extract meaning from minor clues, as
evidenced by his articulate explanation of the mystery); AGATHA CHRISTIE, SLEEPING
MURDER 202–03, 205–06, 214, 232, 236 (1976) (portraying Miss Marple as an
idiosyncratic genius through her resolution of the crime); ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The
Beryl Coronet, in THE ADVENTURES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 244, 264–69 (Oxford
University Press 1993) (1892) (portraying Sherlock Holmes as capable of deducing the
meaning of things from minor clues).  Detectives of the hard-boiled era are often at odds 
with official investigators, sometimes due to the public official’s outright corruption and, 
at other times, due to frustration with professional neglect. See, e.g., LEHMAN, supra
note 3, at 144 (“The contract between the reader and writer of a Chandler novel calls for
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past event,10 gradually transforming to track the zeitgeist of the author
and the author’s age.11 
Spy fiction emerged in the early part of the last century as a
recognizable genre unto itself,12 and although it has much in common 
with detective fiction, it also departs from that style in important ways.13 
a shared view of our social world as universally corrupt. . . .  Everyone is implicated; no 
one is safe.”); SEAN MCCANN, GUMSHOE AMERICA: HARD-BOILED CRIME FICTION AND
THE RISE AND FALL OF NEW DEAL LIBERALISM 39–40 (2000). 
10. The work of Conan Doyle, Poe, and Christie never doubts the certainty of the 
crime’s solution, whose clear and singular explication by the detective hero is the climax
of each of those stories.  LEHMAN, supra note 3, at 110 (“For the exonerated suspects, the 
feeling is one of relief; and the confident expectation of that relief—the certainty
of a happy ending—is what makes the earlier tension not only bearable but desirable.”).
Later, although ambiguity and uncertainty begin to infect the narrative of the hard-boiled 
writers, they, too, ultimately produce a singular “solution.” See CHANDLER, THE 
BIG SLEEP, supra note 6, at 223–24, 226–27.  It was not until the postmodern experiments of
Jorge Luis Borges, Alain Robbe-Grillet, and Gabriel García Márquez that the genre 
became a mode of illustrating the indeterminacy of fact and the unreliability of memory.
See, e.g., JORGE LUIS BORGES, Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, in FICCIONES (Alianza 
Editorial 1997) (1944); MÁRQUEZ, supra note 7; CHARLES J. RZEPKA, DETECTIVE FICTION 
186, 234 (2005). 
11. Some of the many excellent literary critiques of detective fiction, tracking this 
evolution in the genre, include Robin Winks, Julian Symons, and Charles Rzepka.  See, 
e.g., RZEPKA, supra note 10; SYMONS, supra note 3; ROBIN W. WINKS, MODUS
OPERANDI: AN EXCURSION INTO DETECTIVE FICTION (1982). 
12. Critics usually mark the genre’s birth with the works of Joseph Conrad and 
John Buchan.  See generally JOHN BUCHAN, GREENMANTLE (1916); JOHN BUCHAN, THE 
THIRTY-NINE STEPS (1915); JOSEPH CONRAD, THE SECRET AGENT: A SIMPLE TALE (Bruce
Harkness & S.W. Reid eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1990) (1907).  See also  JOHN G.
CAWELTI & BRUCE A. ROSENBERG, THE SPY STORY 34 (1987) (“The spy story gradually
took shape in the nineteenth century and became a widely popular narrative formula 
around the time of World War I.”). Agatha Christie, perhaps the best known writer of
detective fiction, wrote a small number of espionage tales that feature a somewhat naïve 
and nationalistic tone and have not received much critical attention. See, e.g., AGATHA
CHRISTIE, THE SECRET ADVERSARY (1922) (featuring the characters Tommy and Tuppence, 
English upper-class friends who are accidentally drawn into a tale of international 
intrigue involving the sinking of the Lusitania and a secret treaty).
13. One important distinction between the two genres is that detective fiction
centers on the solution of a particular crime of one individual against another—usually
murder—but espionage fiction has at its narrative core international conflicts, which may
include crimes against individuals that are merely ancillary to the political conflicts of 
nations enacted through their institutions and agencies.  See WINKS, supra note 11, at 79
(observing that spy fiction “attempts to account for events already transpired and to
control events yet to come;” that “[m]ost often evidence must be read backwards, inferred
from events;” and that “[t]o this extent spy fiction is at the far end of the continuum from 
traditional mystery fiction, which begins by setting the scene, introducing the characters,
usually killing one of them, and reconstructing what must have happened”); Glenn W.
Most, The Hippocratic Smile: John le Carré and the Traditions of the Detective Novel, in
THE POETICS OF MURDER: DETECTIVE FICTION AND LITERARY THEORY 341, 354–55
(Glenn W. Most & William W. Stowe eds., 1983) (observing that common features of
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Like detective fiction, it supplies a source of insight into contemporaneous 
and evolving popular attitudes toward law.  Its focus lies less on the 
procedural aspects of crime and punishment, and more on the nature of 
factfinding itself and the relation between the individual and the state, a 
relation that law claims to order.  Indeed, one of the more startling
aspects of law, as depicted in spy fiction, is that it appears to permit 
certain state actors—those “licensed to kill”14—to commit the most
serious crimes; acts hailed as necessary and even heroic, rather than 
deserving of punishment.  That the legal sanctioning of the most profound
societal taboo is a centerpiece of the spy novel suggests that this genre of 
fiction may offer broader and deeper critiques of law in the modern era 
than its predecessors in the genre of detection. 
This paper considers the work of two of spy fiction’s most prolific and 
popular authors: Ian Fleming, creator of James Bond,15 and John le
murder and spy novels are deceit and violent death but that the mystery novel looks
backward, whereas spy novels look forward toward the prevention of harm). 
14. As James Bond muses:
It was part of his profession to kill people.  He had never liked doing it and 
when he had to kill he did it as well as he knew how and forgot about it.  As a
secret agent who held the rare double-O prefix—the license to kill in the Secret
Service—it was his duty to be as cool about death as a surgeon.
IAN FLEMING, GOLDFINGER 003 (Penguin Books 2002) (1959). See, e.g., CAWELTI &
ROSENBERG, supra note 12, at 134 (“007, the number that gives an agent official sanction
to kill.”); see also  JOHN LE CARRÉ, THE SPY WHO CAME IN FROM THE COLD 15, 17 
(Pocket Books 2001) (1963) (“[Control, head of the British Intelligence Service, to
Leamas, an agent:] ‘I mean you can’t be less ruthless than the opposition simply because
your government’s policy is benevolent, can you now?’ . . . ‘That is why,’ Control 
continued, ‘I think we ought to try and get rid of Mundt . . . .’  [Leamas responds to
Control:] ‘If it’s a question of killing Mundt, I’m game.’”); LEROY L. PANEK, THE
SPECIAL BRANCH: THE BRITISH SPY NOVEL, 1890–1980, at 215 (1981) (observing that 
Bond “act[s] as an assassin” and that “[i]n the books, we see him personally killing the 
antagonists in Diamonds Are Forever, From Russia, With Love, Dr. No, Goldfinger, The
Spy Who Loved Me, You Only Live Twice, and The Man with the Golden Gun”).
15. A bibliography of Fleming’s Bond novels would include the following: Casino 
Royale (1953), Live and Let Die (1954), Moonraker (1955), Diamonds Are Forever
(1956), From Russia, With Love (1957), Doctor No (1958), Goldfinger (1959), Thunderball
(1961), On Her Majesty’s Secret Service (1963), You Only Live Twice (1964), and The
Man with the Golden Gun (1965).  See IAN FLEMING, CASINO ROYALE (1953); IAN
FLEMING, DIAMONDS ARE FOREVER (1956); IAN FLEMING, DOCTOR NO (1958); IAN
FLEMING, FROM RUSSIA, WITH LOVE (1957); FLEMING, supra note 14; IAN FLEMING, LIVE 
AND LET DIE (1954); IAN FLEMING, THE MAN WITH THE GOLDEN GUN (1965); IAN 
FLEMING, MOONRAKER (1955); IAN FLEMING, ON HER MAJESTY’S SECRET SERVICE
(1963); IAN FLEMING, THUNDERBALL (1961) [hereinafter FLEMING, THUNDERBALL]; IAN
FLEMING, YOU ONLY LIVE TWICE (1964); see also PANEK, supra note 14, at 202 (listing
Fleming’s spy novels).  Most of these titles became films, meeting with great popularity
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Carré, creator of Alec Leamas, “the spy who came in from the cold,”16 
as well as of George Smiley and the British spy agency that le Carré 
dubs “the Circus.”17  These works imagine legal orders that share many 
fundamental attributes, but their protagonists—Bond and Leamas— 
cannot be more different.  Bond is a superhuman, two-dimensional hero
who lives a life of adventure that can only exist in fantasy: extraordinarily
handsome, sophisticated in his tastes, invincible, but not particularly
reflective about the moral aspects of his work as spy and, at times,
assassin.18  Leamas is, by contrast, an unprepossessing everyman, beaten 
down by personal and professional failures, and troubled by the moral
and financial success when originally released, as well as in their second life as contemporary 
remakes and spinoffs.  See, e.g., PANEK, supra note 14, at 219 n.1 (listing Bond films 
with their years of theatrical release); Casino Royale (2006), THE INTERNET MOVIE
DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0381061/ (last visited July 21, 2010); Dr. No 
(1962), THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0055928/ (last 
visited July 21, 2010); Goldfinger (1964), THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.
imdb.com/title/tt0058150/ (last visited July 21, 2010); Quantum of Solace (2008), THE
INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1139644/ (last visited July 21, 
2010). In addition, a number of other authors wrote novels based on the characters created by
Ian Fleming after Fleming’s death. See, e.g., RAYMOND BENSON, DIE ANOTHER DAY (2002)
(a novelization based on the screenplay by Neal Purvis and Robert Wade); RAYMOND
BENSON, TOMORROW NEVER DIES (1997) (a novelization based on the screenplay by
Bruce Feirstein); JOHN GARDNER, GOLDENEYE (1995) (a novelization based on the 
screenplay by Michael France and Jeffrey Caine); JOHN GARNDER, LICENSE RENEWED
(1981); JOHN GARDNER, LICENSE TO KILL (1989) (a novelization based on the screenplay
by Michael G. Wilson and Richard Maibaum); JOHN GARDNER, WIN, LOSE OR DIE (1989). 
 16. LE CARRÉ, supra note 14.  Although George Smiley plays a relatively small
role in this novel, it is nevertheless central to the analysis herein because it so clearly 
explicates le Carré’s attitudes toward law and the legal regime, as well as being 
chronologically close to the works of Fleming to which this paper makes comparisons. 
17. Le Carré’s works depicting the world of British espionage include the following: 
Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (1974), The Honourable Schoolboy (1977), and Smiley’s
People (1979).  See JOHN LE CARRÉ, THE HONOURABLE SCHOOLBOY (1977) [hereinafter
LE CARRÉ, HONOURABLE SCHOOLBOY]; JOHN LE CARRÉ, TINKER, TAILOR, SOLDIER, SPY
(1974) [hereinafter LE CARRÉ, TINKER]; JOHN LE CARRÉ, SMILEY’S PEOPLE (1979).  Other 
works for which he has received much critical and popular acclaim include The Little 
Drummer Girl (1983), A Perfect Spy (1986), The Constant Gardener (2001), The Russia
House (1989), The Night Manager (1993), and A Most Wanted Man (2008).  See JOHN LE
CARRÉ, A MOST WANTED MAN (2008); JOHN LE CARRÉ, A PERFECT SPY (1986); JOHN LE
CARRÉ, THE CONSTANT GARDENER (2001); JOHN LE CARRÉ, THE LITTLE DRUMMER GIRL
(1983); JOHN LE CARRÉ, THE NIGHT MANAGER (1993); JOHN LE CARRÉ, THE RUSSIA 
HOUSE (1989). See generally  DAVID MONAGHAN, SMILEY’S CIRCUS: A GUIDE TO THE
SECRET WORLD OF JOHN LE CARRÉ (1986) (containing a taxonomy of the Smiley novel’s
characters and plot).
18. See supra note 15; see also PANEK, supra note 14, at 215 (observing that Bond 
is seen “personally killing the antagonists in Diamonds Are Forever, From Russia, With 
Love, Dr. No, Goldfinger, The Spy Who Loved Me, You Only Live Twice and The Man
with the Golden Gun”).
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ambiguities of his espionage work.19  Yet both represent a similar set of 
distinctly postwar attitudes toward the function of law, its growing 
indeterminacy, and the complex nature of its institutions.20 
This paper explores the representation of law in espionage fiction as a 
variation on the larger representation of law in detective fiction, focusing 
in turn on each of several aspects: law as a tool of factfinding—Part II;
law as the set of principles that order the relation of the individual to the 
state—Part III; and law as a positivist embodiment of the moral norms of 
a culture—Part IV.  This paper suggests that espionage fiction expresses
a cultural acknowledgment of the demise of law: that the representation 
of law in each of these modalities is as a system that enjoys very little 
public trust or respect and that fails to perform any of its essential
functions in a satisfactory way.
II. LAW AS FACTFINDING
One of the basic premises of law is that the state can task an individual 
or group of individuals—judge or jury—with determining the truth of a 
past event so that appropriate legal consequences can attach.21  The  
 19. LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 10 (describing Leamas as “a short man with close, 
iron-grey hair, and the physique of a swimmer,” who is “very strong,” as revealed in “the
stubby formation of his hands and fingers,” with a “utilitarian approach to clothes, as he 
did to most other things,” and noting that “[i]f he were to walk into a London club the
porter would certainly not mistake him for a member” because “[h]e looked like a man 
who could make trouble, a man who looked after his money, a man who was not quite a 
gentleman”). 
20. As Julian Symons explains: 
It is right, I think, to see two traditions in the spy story . . . .  The first is 
conservative, supporting authority, making the implicit assertion that agents 
are fighting to protect something valuable in society. The second is radical,
critical of authority, claiming that agents perpetuate, and even create, false
barriers between “Us” and “Them.”  Fleming belongs to the first tradition, le 
Carré’s early work to the second. 
SYMONS, supra note 3, at 225. 
21. See Rosanna Cavallaro, Pride and Prejudice and Proof: Quotidian Factfinding
and the Rules of Evidence, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 697, 697 & n.2 (2004) (noting that “the 
legal process is concerned with the accurate and orderly evaluation of disputed facts and
past events,” but acknowledging that although “the traditional assumption has been that 
the primary purpose of adjudication is truthseeking, . . . this premise has been challenged
by a variety of scholars proposing alternative purposes”) (citing FED. R. EVID. 102
(stating that evidence rules shall be construed “to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined”)); Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology 
and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1500 (2001) (recognizing that although
“Federal Rule 102 defines the ‘purpose’ of the rules as ‘that the truth may be ascertained,’ . . .
 647
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guilty can be punished; the tortfeasor can be made to pay damages.
Underpinning the imposition of legal rules and sanctions is an
institutional faith that the facts upon which the rules are predicated are 
determinable with a degree of certainty, which makes the imposition of
those legal consequences legitimate. Thus, a significant, perhaps even
central, function of the legal system is that it is a mechanism for determining
facts conclusively, preempting the dissemination of alternative narratives
with a singular “decision” about an event.  The forms of law with which
we are now so familiar—the allegations of fact in a complaint,22 the
denial or admission of those facts in the corresponding answer,23 the 
complex rules of evidence by which disputed facts are proven and
adjudicated, or “found,”24 the array of procedural rules regarding burdens 
of proof,25 the preclusive effect of prior findings,26 and the unreviewability
of issues of fact27—are all directed toward this central function of law. 
In order to accept law’s legitimacy, the community within which law 
operates must necessarily accept the accuracy of those factual
determinations upon which it is predicated.  Public perceptions of factual 
inaccuracy, of which there have been a growing number, create a
corresponding skepticism about the justness of legal outcomes, in turn 
creating social instability.28  The unraveling of criminal convictions
some of the rules themselves have no veritistic dimension, while others mix veritistic and
non-veritistic concerns”); David P. Leonard, The Use of Character To Prove Conduct:
Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 38–43 (1986)
(suggesting that the role of trial is to produce “catharsis”); Chris William Sanchirico, 
Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1229 n.1, 1230
(2001) (suggesting that the “rules governing what happens inside the courtroom can be 
understood adequately only in the context of the state’s central project of regulating
behavior outside the courtroom” through the provision of incentives for that behavior, 
citing, as an example of the truth seeking approach, inter alia, H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of
Character To Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 845, 845 (1982) (“The process of litigation is designed for the reconstruction
of an event that occurred in the recent past.”), and citing, as an example of the nontruth 
seeking approach, Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and 
the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1985) (contending that the 
purpose of adjudication is to produce “acceptable verdicts”)).
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (form of claim for relief). 
23. See id. 8(b) (form of answer). 
24. See FED. R. EVID. 102 (noting that the purpose of the rules is “to the end that 
the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined”).
25. See, e.g., id. 301 (regarding presumptions and burdens of proof in civil 
actions). 
26. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (listing res judicata as an affirmative defense).
27. See id. 52(a)(6) (stating that questions of fact “must not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous”). 
28. See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 21 (contending that the purpose of adjudication is
to produce “acceptable verdicts”). 
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using newly available DNA technology is one area in which the factual 
predicate for legal judgments has been called into question,29 generating
deep public concern about the legitimacy of criminal penalties, including 
but not limited to the death penalty.30 Similarly, the accumulation of 
social science data that suggest we are often inaccurate and unreliable in 
our identifications of others, particularly when those identifications
cross-racial categories, has had a similarly destabilizing effect in the
criminal justice system.31  Even fingerprinting, long a touchstone of
scientific accuracy and reliability, is now in doubt.32 Amid this growing 
29. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Consensus on Counting the Innocent: We Can’t, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, at A14 (reporting that methods for determining the number of 
those falsely convicted of all crimes using confirmed exonerations in rape cases are 
analytically flawed); Solomon Moore, Study Calls for Oversight of Forensics in Crime 
Labs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at A13 (reporting on a National Science Foundation 
study finding that “[c]rime laboratories around the country are grossly underfunded, lack
a scientific foundation and are compromised by critical delays in analyzing physical
evidence”).  But see Adam Liptak, Court Rejects Inmate Right to DNA Tests, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2009, at A1 (reporting that the United States Supreme Court refused to 
hold that an inmate has a constitutional right to DNA testing that might prove an inmate’s 
innocence, although acknowledging the “unparalleled ability” of DNA testing “both to 
exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty,” and that such testing has 
played a role in some 240 exonerations (quoting Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 
S. Ct. 2308, 2312 (2009))). 
30. See Cavallaro, supra note 7, at 39 n.144 (“In 2000, Governor George Ryan
imposed a moratorium on executions in Illinois, citing concerns about fairness in a legal 
system that had convicted and imposed death sentences on 13 individuals who were
subsequently exonerated.” (citing GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 
REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 207 (2002), available
at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/ index.html (concluding, 
after an extensive study ordered by Illinois Governor George Ryan, that “no system, given
human nature and frailties, could ever be devised or constructed that would work perfectly
and guarantee absolutely that no innocent person is ever again sentenced to death”); Dirk
Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at 
A1; Dirk Johnson, No Executions in Illinois Until System Is Repaired, N.Y. TIMES, May 
21, 2000, at 20)); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536–37 (2006) (“[P]risoners
asserting innocence as a gateway to defaulted claims must establish that, in light of new 
evidence, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995))). 
31. See John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial 
Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 209 (2001) (noting that “[a] 1996 study found 
that twenty-eight convictions predicated upon eyewitness IDs have been overturned as a 
result of DNA evidence,” and that “[a]nother study implicated mistaken eyewitness IDs 
as the cause of more than 60% of the five hundred wrongful convictions studied” (citing, 
inter alia, Jennifer L. Devenport et al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Evaluating 
Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 338, 338 (1997))). 
32. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Laboratory Error Seen Through the Lens of 
Science and Policy, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1109 (1997); Tamara F. Lawson, Can
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skepticism, it is no wonder that Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) dramas, 
in which the solution to grisly crimes of violence lies in the hands of the 
unerring forensic scientist, enjoy such public fascination and wide
popularity: such shows operate in the realm of fiction, allaying public 
anxiety about the uncertainty of factual truth and offering the possibility
of easy and consistent accuracy, even when the real crime labs are
revealed as error ridden, overburdened, and at times even corrupt.33 
In classic detective fiction, too, facts are central.  As the sobriquet 
“whodunit?” implies,34 facts are at the core of a mystery’s plot.  The
trajectory of the classic detective novel is, typically, from a place of very
little knowledge of the facts, through a web of red herrings and
distractions, to a complete and coherent explication of the crime, its 
perpetrator, and the perpetrator’s motives and methods.35  This resolution, 
usually announced or explained by the detective who is the “hero” of the 
novel, is the capstone of the reader’s experience.  Whether it is Sherlock
Holmes explaining his reasoning to a befuddled Watson,36 or Hercule 
Poirot gathering all the suspects for a detailed unraveling of his 
analysis,37 the denouement is the payoff for the reader’s investment of 
time and interest in the plot’s twists and turns. 
Significantly, in the detective novel, there is only one solution;
competing explanations are depicted as errors—often made by official
law enforcement—at some times contrived or promulgated by the 
Fingerprints Lie?: Re-Weighing Fingerprint Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 1, 18 (2003) (applying Daubert-Kumho to fingerprint evidence and noting “the 
main sticking points regarding fingerprint identification evidence, which are: (1) the
unquestioned reliability that has been artificially placed upon fingerprint evidence and
(2) the question of whether, in fact, forensic science is science at all”).
33. See, e.g., Jason Felch & Maura Dolan, DNA: Genes as Evidence: A Showdown 
in O.C., L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at A1 (describing how crime labs, often run by law 
enforcement agencies, have been affected by instances of fraud or undue influence). 
34. See Whodunit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/whodunit (last visited July, 26 2010) (defining whodunit as “a
detective story or mystery story” and as an alteration of “who done it?” dating back to 1930). 
35. See  LEHMAN, supra note 3, at 110; RZEPKA, supra note 10, at 19 (describing
the analeptic solution that ends classic detective stories in which “the detective (or 
sometimes the criminal himself) provides a summary narrative that connects and puts in
proper order both the array of events leading up to the crime and the array of events by
which the detective himself arrived at the correct sequence of the first array”).
36. See, e.g., SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Adventure of the Dancing Men, in
THE RETURN OF SHERLOCK HOLMES (1903), reprinted in 1 SHERLOCK HOLMES: THE 
COMPLETE NOVELS AND STORIES 824 (Bantam Books 1986) (“‘Having once recognized, 
however, that the symbols stood for letters, and having applied the rules which guide us 
in all forms of secret writings, the solution was easy enough.’”). 
37. See, e.g., AGATHA CHRISTIE, MURDER ON THE ORIENT EXPRESS 200–12
(Bantam Books 1983) (1934) (detailing the solution to a murder on a train).
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perpetrator in order to mislead or throw off suspicion, at other times 
accidental or coincidental.  But there is no ambiguity by the novel’s end,
no suggestion that the fingerprints might be impossible to identify with 
certainty, or that the conversations or events to which others have
testified might be confused, conflicting, or unreliable.  The question
instead is only how these “facts” add up. 
Even in the detective fiction of the later twentieth century, often 
described as “hard boiled,” the inquiry into the truth of an event remains
central to the narrative.38  Although the hard-boiled detectives of
Raymond Chandler and Dashiell Hammett novels play a more active 
role in the events, witnessing and even participating in the violence that
is the fallout of the initial crime, they, too, ultimately reach a place of 
understanding, in which a singular truth can be discerned amid the haze 
of subplots.39  The Maltese Falcon is worthless, Brigid O’Shaughnessy
murdered Sam Spade’s partner, and her motive—greed—is ordinary.40 
No one is mistaken, no fact or memory susceptible to doubt.  Although 
motives may be more obscure than those of the classic detective fiction 
of Agatha Christie or Dorothy L. Sayers, they are nonetheless discernible.41 
This capacity for factual certainty, which makes the detective fiction 
genre both plausible and satisfying, mirrors a contemporaneous popular 
attitude toward factual truth: there is an objectivity to facts that permits 
legal institutions to seek and “find” them as a predicate to the imposition 
of legal consequences.42  What Poirot and Holmes do in fiction is what
38. See Dashiell Hammett, House Dick (1923), reprinted in  NIGHTMARE TOWN:
STORIES 42, 46 (Kirby McCauley et al. eds., 1999)  (“From any crime to its author there 
is a trail. It may be . . . obscure . . . since matter cannot move without disturbing other matter 
along its path, [but] there is—there must be—a trail of some sort.  And finding and following
such trails is what a detective is paid to do.”); RZEPKA, supra note 10, at 187 (noting that 
“no Hammett story ends with uncertainty regarding the material facts of the case”).
39. See RZEPKA, supra note 10, at 186 (“At the end of The Maltese Falcon we get 
a complete analeptic account of events, just as we do at the end of a story by Christie or 
Sayers.  Recited at length by Spade to Brigid O’Shaughnessy, this recapitulation sets out 
the complete array of the novel, including both what has transpired in the course of the 
narrative and what has led up to the opening scene.”). 
40. See DASHIELL HAMMETT, THE MALTESE FALCON 209–10, 215–16 (Vintage 
Books 1992) (1929). 
 41. RZEPKA, supra note 10, at 192–93 (arguing that a central theme of Hammett’s 
The Maltese Falcon is that “the truth of a story is immaterial as long as you can persuade 
others to believe it, or to behave as if they do”).
42. See, e.g., NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 53–54
(1978) (“A rule of law is general in terms, stipulating that whenever a given set of 
operative facts occurs (p), a given legal consequence is to follow (q).”). 
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juries do at trial: sort out the messiness of facts and wade through conflicting 
testimony, never doubting that there is one “correct” conclusion that can
be reached by majority43 or, in matters of liberty, unanimity.44 
Moreover, although detective fiction is interested in “whodunit,” the 
“who” itself is never really in doubt.  Individuals are essentially
knowable, with a singular identity, although their motives may be hidden 
or disguised.  Indeed, in the detective fiction of the classic or golden age, 
identity often operates at the level of stereotype, with characters that are
fully comprehensible to the reader once identified by type: the retired
army colonel, the spinster, the social climber.45  The struggle is not to
determine the personality and unique nature of each of these players, but 
rather to discover the web of events and relationships among those 
acting true to those natures that might have led to a homicide.  Again,
43. See FED. R. CIV. P. 48 (allowing parties in civil cases to stipulate to a majority
verdict instead of a unanimous verdict).
44. In those matters in which accuracy in factfinding is deemed critical, such as
those in which criminal sanctions are to be imposed, unanimous verdicts are required.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (containing the constitutional right to a trial by jury); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 31 (requiring unanimous verdicts in federal criminal trials); Apodaca v. Oregon, 
406 U.S. 404, 406–11 (1972) (holding that a state rule allowing for a conviction by less 
than a unanimous jury does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, but 
explaining the legislative history and precedent surrounding the unanimity requirement).
This requirement presupposes that such unanimity is possible, and the remedy for failure
to achieve it is not existential anxiety but a simple mistrial and “do-over” until that level
of consensus can be reached.  Admittedly, there are times when the facts are especially
resistant to consensus, and there can be multiple mistrials and retrials, but that is
the exception to a rule of accord.  See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 (“If the jury cannot agree 
on a verdict on one or more counts, the court may declare a mistrial on those counts. 
The government may retry any defendant on any count on which the jury could not 
agree.”). There are also instances of compromise verdicts and even of logically inconsistent
verdicts.  See, e.g., State v. Goblet, 618 S.E.2d 257, 264 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing 
logically inconsistent and legally contradictory verdicts), overruled in part, State v.
Tanner, No. 474PA08, 2010 N.C. LEXIS 423 (N.C. June 17, 2010); Eric L. Muller, The
Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 771, 772–76 (1998).  But again, the norm is a binary inquiry in which the finder of 
fact agrees with either one side or the other as to the “truth” of an event.  See, e.g., 
Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact About 
Consent in Rape, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815, 828–31, 848–49 (1996) (noting
that the instruction on mistake of fact in consent cases is often denied because the trial 
judge presumes that jurors will accept the “truth” of either the complainant’s or the 
defendant’s version of events, rather than selecting portions from each individual’s narrative). 
45. See, e.g., LEHMAN, supra note 3, at 111 (“Each suspect wears his tag on his 
lapel like an identity card.”).  Lehman gives the example of Agatha Christie’s Death on 
the Nile, “whose cast includes such murder-mystery stalwarts as the mustachioed British
colonel . . . , the excitable romantic novelist . . . , the hardnosed greedy American 
attorney . . . , and the armchair revolutionary.” Id. at 106–07. 
652
CAVALLARO FINAL PAGES (DO NOT DELETE) 9/13/2010 10:33 AM      
  
























    
 
 
    
   
   
 
   
  
  
[VOL. 47:  641, 2010] Licensed To Kill
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the premise is that individuals are essentially knowable to others and that 
once known, their conduct in particular circumstances is fairly predictable.46 
In spy novels, however, the issue is often not “whodunit” but “who is 
it?”  The central narrative tension, the puzzle that drives the plot, concerns
identity itself, and the facts and circumstances—actions, appearance,
relationships, memory—that comprise one’s understanding of the
identity of another.47  This metaphoric uncertainty about identity generates 
all the consequential indeterminacy and accompanying anxiety that are
the stuff of the best-loved spy stories.48  The conduct of an individual,
viewed through the lenses of various possible identities—loyal or
traitorous—takes on entirely different meanings depending on which of 
those lenses accurately reveals the “truth.”49 
In le Carré’s The Spy Who Came in from the Cold, the game of
multiple identities is played until the very end of the novel, with chilling 
results.  Alec Leamas begins the novel as the head of a ring of British 
agents working in East Germany, watching as the last of his team is shot 
trying to cross to freedom at the newly erected Berlin Wall.50  Believing 
46. See Cavallaro, supra note 21, at 725 n.99 (discussing “trait theorists,” a school 
of social scientists who “‘came to believe that traits “are relatively stable and enduring 
predispositions,” which exert sufficient influence to produce generally consistent behavior
across widely divergent situations’” (quoting Miguel A. Méndez, The Law of Evidence
and the Search for a Stable Personality, 45 EMORY L.J. 221, 227 (1996) (quoting
WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 6 (Lawrence Erlbaum Assocs. 1996)
(1968)))).  But see Miguel A. Méndez, Character Evidence Reconsidered: “People Do 
Not Seem To Be Predictable Characters.,” 49 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 878 (1998)
(“[R]esearch conducted for much of this century showed that behavior is largely shaped 
by specific situational determinants that do not lend themselves easily to predictions 
about individual behavior.”).
47. See, e.g., LE CARRÉ, TINKER, supra note 17 (focusing the novel on four career 
British intelligence agents, one of whom is actually a “mole,” or spy for the enemy).
48. See, e.g., GRAHAM GREENE, THE QUIET AMERICAN (Viking Press 1965) (1955)
(telling the story of a seemingly amoral civil servant who becomes aware of the 
clandestine activities of an American agent in Vietnam); ROBERT LUDLUM, THE BOURNE
IDENTITY (Bantam Books 1988) (1980) (telling the story of an American intelligence
agent who has systematically had his own identity erased by his controllers so that he can
be an efficiently amoral killing machine).  See also CAWELTI & ROSENBERG, supra note 12,
at 29 (noting that Greene’s novels concern themselves with the phenomenon of ordinary
people caught up in the tension and duplicity of espionage).
49. See  CAWELTI  & ROSENBERG, supra note 12, at 16–17 (describing the 
psychological tension inherent in the clandestine world, generated by the continual need 
for pretense and duplicity). 
 50. LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 7 (“The East German sentry fired, quite carefully, 
away from them, into his own sector.  The first shot seemed to thrust Karl forward, the 
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that these agents have been “blown” through the counterintelligence of 
an East German agent named Karl Mundt,51 he agrees to undertake 
Mundt’s murder at the behest of Control, the Chief of British Intelligence.52 
Pretending to be down-and-out after the collapse of his network,53 
Leamas appears to leave the Circus under a cloud of suspicion about 
missing monies,54 takes a menial job in a library, picks a fight with a 
local grocer, and ends up serving several months in jail.55  Upon his  
release, apparently now completely cut off from his past as a British
intelligence agent, he allows himself to be recruited by East Germany as 
a spy, intentionally leaking information about clandestine British
payments abroad, which allows his East German handler, Fiedler, to
suspect Mundt of being in the pay of the British.56  Leamas is given to
understand throughout that the goal of his mission is to bring down 
Mundt by providing the evidence needed to accuse Mundt of treason.57 
Even as this complex plot unfolds, however, the reader is made privy 
to another set of events by which Leamas himself is undermined and the 
nature of facts and knowledge is challenged.  As one critic has put it, the 
object of the novel is for the reader “to discover that the search for truth
and justice is not the real object but only a ruse to protect their opposites 
second to pull him back. . . .  Then he sagged, rolled to the ground, and they heard quite 
clearly the clatter of the bike as it fell. Leamas hoped to God he was dead.”).
51. As Control puts it, “‘[Mundt is] a killer. . . .  He tried to kill George Smiley.
And of course he shot the woman’s husband [in an earlier novel, A Call for the Dead].
He is a very distasteful man.  Ex Hitler-Youth and all that kind of thing.  Not at all the 
intellectual kind of Communist.  A practitioner of the cold war.’” Id. at 16.  See also id.
at 13 (“[Control says to Leamas:] ‘I suppose that girl blew him—Elvira?’  [Leamas 
replies,] ‘I suppose so.’ . . .  ‘And Mundt had him shot,’ Control added.”). 
52. See id. at 15, 17 (“[Control said,] ‘I think we ought to try and get rid of
Mundt.’ . . .  [Leamas responds,] ‘If it’s a question of killing Mundt, I’m game.’”). 
53. See id. at 19 (“In the full view of his colleagues he was transformed from a 
man honourably put aside to a resentful, drunken wreck—and all within a few months.”). 
54. See id. at 20 (“It leaked out—no one, as usual, knew where from—that 
Leamas’ sudden departure was connected with irregularities in the accounts of Banking 
Section.”).
55. See id. at 24 (“Finally he took the job in the library.”); id. at 37 (describing the 
fight with the grocer); id. at 38–40 (describing Leamas’s time in jail).
56. See id. at 116-18 (“[Fiedler, Leamas’s interrogator, asks,] ‘Tell me: this 
money, these large sums in foreign banks—what did you think they were for?’ . . .  [He 
suggests tracking the payments and says,] ‘[W]e shall know where the agent was on a
certain day. That seems to be a useful thing to know.’”).
57. See id. at 121 (“Control had been phenomenally right.  Fiedler was walking 
like a man led in his sleep, into the net which Control had spread for him.  It was 
uncanny to observe the growing identity of interest between Fiedler and Control: it was 
as if they had agreed on the same plan, and Leamas had been despatched to fulfill it.”).
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for reasons of national self–interest . . . .”58  Control’s goal is not to bring
Mundt down but quite the reverse—to shield him from suspicion as the 
double agent he actually is—and Control has determined to accomplish 
this by keeping his own agent, Leamas, in the dark.59  Even while  
Leamas plays his part, allowing himself to be recruited as a disaffected
defector, British agents, including George Smiley, have approached the 
woman with whom Leamas had an affair during his down-and-out
period, and have offered to pay her housing expenses and otherwise 
provide for her.60  They have also made a payment to the grocer whom
Leamas struck.61  This connection between Leamas and British Intelligence, 
wholly at odds with his apparent defection, becomes a weapon for 
Mundt to impeach Leamas, rebuff Fiedler’s accusation, and demonstrate 
to his critics that Mundt has been the victim of British spy craft.62  Using
Liz’s membership in the local branch of the Communist Party, Mundt
 58. Most, supra note 13, at 361.  Most goes on to link this plot inversion to the 
hard-boiled genre of which it is a descendant: 
Yet, by turning those who believe in the ideals of detection into naive pawns in 
the hands of the cynical practitioners of Realpolitik, The Spy Who Came in 
from the Cold pushes Chandler’s moral disillusionment an important step 
farther.  Le Carré’s novel implicitly asks the question whether English society 
has not reached the point at which the truth must be suppressed and justice 
thwarted if the society is to be preserved. 
Id. at 362. 
59. As Leamas explains at the novel’s close,
“We are witnessing the lousy end to a filthy, lousy operation to save Mundt’s 
skin.  To save him from a clever little Jew in his own department who had
begun to suspect the truth.  They made us kill him, d’you see, kill the Jew. 
Now you know, and God help us both.” 
LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 199. See also MONAGHAN, supra note 17, at 16 (noting that 
Control allows Mundt to destroy Leamas’s East Berlin network to enhance his prestige 
within the East German security service, thereby giving Control access to more valuable 
information from that source). 
 60. LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 180 (“[Liz explains to the tribunal,] ‘I’ve got a
lease.  Someone bought the lease and sent it to me.’”).  See also id. at 92–94 (describing 
the visit of George Smiley); id. at 173 (“[Mundt’s lawyer examines Leamas:] ‘[Y]ou
cannot imagine that Smiley would have taken any interest in you after you left the 
Circus?’  [Leamas responds,] ‘God, no.’  [Mundt’s lawyer continues,] ‘Nor in your 
welfare after you went to prison, nor spent money on your dependents . . . ?’”). 
61. See id. at 181 (“[Liz testified,] ‘I heard in the street that the grocer had got 
some money, a lot of money from somewhere after the trial.  There was a lot of talk 
about it, and I knew it must be Alec’s friend . . .’”) (ellipsis in the original). 
62. See id. at 184 (“[Mundt’s lawyer, at the end of Liz’s evidence, states,] ‘This is 
not the first time that a revanchist plot has been uncovered through the decadence of its 
architects.’”).
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arranges for her to be “invited” to visit East Germany,63 where she is
then brought to appear as a witness against Leamas.  Mundt describes 
Smiley’s visit to her,64 as well as Leamas’s own words, in which Leamas 
told her that “‘there was something he had to do; someone he had to get
even with, whatever it cost’” and that he would be going away for a
while.65 
Significantly, le Carré uses the legal ritual of Mundt’s trial as the 
vehicle through which to reveal the plot inversion he has only, until then,
foreshadowed.66  Openly mocking the Anglo-American image of the
trial as a search for truth, le Carré demonstrates the manipulations of 
evidence and witnesses that are possible within any trial and that British,
not East German, intelligence has cynically masterminded.67  It is not  
because the formal legal process of the Soviet bloc nation is wanting but 
because of the duplicitous and deliberate seeding of the factual record by
Smiley and Control that the trial unravels in a direction Leamas and the
reader cannot expect.  Exploitation of Liz’s genuine concern for Leamas 
becomes the tool that backfires against Leamas and Fiedler, and “saves”
Mundt.68  Indeed, Liz’s intrusion into the trial is an externalization of the
clash of identities that has been a source of strain throughout the novel, a 
representation in the world of the uneasy integration of Leamas’s spy
identity with his authentic self.69  In this way, le Carré invites the reader
to see the trial process—the mechanism by which a civilized and 
sophisticated legal system determines the truth of a matter—as a sham. 
The novel’s denouement, then, powerfully denounces law and its
accompanying institutions and their promises.70 
Although the reader is permitted inside knowledge of Control’s 
counterplot to save Mundt and sacrifice Fiedler, our sympathies throughout
63. See id. at 132–33 (letter of invitation). 
64. See id. at 181–82. 
65. Id. at 184. 
66. See id. at 155–91. 
67. See SYMONS, supra note 3, at 226 (“The whole apparatus of the trial in the Spy
is a game . . . . And the purpose of such party games is betrayal . . . .”).
68. See LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 182 (“[Mundt’s lawyer argues,] ‘Leamas had 
done the one thing British Intelligence had never expected him to do: he had taken a girl
and wept on her shoulder.’”).
69. Leamas is, throughout the novel, cast as a man utterly alone, “out in the cold.” 
Id. at 14; see also id. at 10 (“Somewhere long ago there had been a divorce; somewhere 
there were children, now in their teens, who received their allowance from a rather odd 
private bank in the City.”).  The reader is told that “[o]nly very rarely . . . did he allow 
himself the dangerous luxury of admitting the great lie he lived.”  Id. at 121. See infra
text accompanying notes 88–90 (discussing the title metaphor). 
70. See LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 191 (“And suddenly, with the terrible clarity
of a man too long deceived, Leamas understood the whole ghastly trick.”). 
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are with Leamas, whose experience of the shifting and unreliable nature 
of the facts provides the novel’s emotional core.  On the eve of trial, 
Leamas falls asleep “content in the knowledge that Fiedler was his ally 
and that they would shortly send Mundt to his death.”71  But as the facts 
emerge at trial about the payments to Liz, Leamas becomes less sure, 
thinking:
How the hell did they know so much?  He was sure, he was absolutely sure, 
he hadn’t been followed to Smiley’s house that afternoon.  And the money—
how did they pick up the story about him stealing money from the Circus?  That 
was designed for internal consumption only . . . then how?  For God’s sake, how?
 Bewildered, angry and bitterly ashamed he walked slowly up the gangway, 
stiffly, like a man going to the scaffold.72 
The reader is made to feel the anxiety that accompanies Leamas’s
gradual recognition as he learns of Smiley’s visits to Liz and, finally, 
sees Liz in the East German courtroom, a place in which he never
expected her to appear.73 The reader watches as Leamas struggles to
grasp the significance of each new bit of evidence––to make it fit with 
the facts as he has understood them––and as Fiedler poses questions that
Leamas cannot answer: 
“Mundt knew what to look for—he even knew the girl would provide the 
proof—very clever of Mundt I must say.  He even knew about that lease— 
amazing really. I mean how could he have found out; she didn’t tell anyone.  I
know that girl, I understand her . . . she wouldn’t tell anyone at all.”74 
In this way, each fact and event to which Leamas has assigned meaning 
is upended and must be reintegrated into a new narrative.  As le Carré 
tells it, “And suddenly, with the terrible clarity of a man too long 
deceived, Leamas understood the whole ghastly trick.”75  Unlike the
satisfying closure we expect of the traditional detective novel, here le 
Carré invites the reader to experience facts and truth as essentially
71. Id. at 150. 
72. Id. at 185 (ellipsis in the original).
73. See id. at 175–76 (“[As Liz entered the courtroom and began her testimony,] 
[s]he was interrupted by the sound of movement; the screech of furniture forced aside, 
and Leamas’ voice, hoarse, high-pitched, ugly, filling the room.  ‘You bastards!  Leave 
her alone!’  Liz turned in terror and saw him standing, his white face bleeding and his 
clothes awry, saw a guard hit him with his fist, so that he half fell; then they were both 
upon him . . . .”); id. at 190 (“He fell silent for a moment, then continued.  ‘And I never 
thought you’d bring the girl.  I’ve been a bloody fool.’”). 
74. Id. at 190 (ellipsis in the original).
75. Id. at 191. 
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unknowable, and the anxiety that this indeterminacy produces as 
terrifying.76  The resolution is deeply unsettling rather than cathartic. 
Even though there is an analeptic resolution of the plot—a “truth” to 
be discovered—the fact of its being so thoroughly and cynically concealed 
by those in whom he has placed his greatest trust, is profoundly
disconcerting even to a savvy player like Leamas.  There is little 
pleasure in the revelation of the truth—instead it propels the protagonist 
to suicide.  Thus, one critical difference between spy and detective
fiction is that the emotional resolution is neither the triumph of law 
against criminality nor of order over chaos, but is instead one of despair
and moral ambiguity.
It is easy to see the well from which this fictional fascination with 
identity as the ultimate unknowable fact is drawn: the spy story explores 
through fiction the metaphysical question that has dominated the later
half of the twentieth century—can we ever really know anyone outside 
of ourselves?77  As le Carré’s George Smiley ponders to himself in an
earlier novel, Call for the Dead: 
What did Hesse write?  “Strange to wander in the mist, each is alone.  No tree
knows his neighbour.  Each is alone.” We know nothing of one another, nothing,
Smiley mused. However closely we live together, at whatever time of day or
night we sound the deepest thoughts in one another, we know nothing.78 
This sensibility is at the core of postmodern inquiry.79  The dislocation 
and anxiety that accompany the realization of our metaphysical isolation
are among the central themes of twentieth century philosophy, literature, 
psychology, and the arts.  Robin West describes it this way:
76. See Most, supra note 13, at 361 (“The conventions of the mystery story are 
used as a red herring to deceive the reader as well as the characters and they are 
exploded by the ending, in which the murderer is saved while the East German detective
[Fiedler] and the English avenger are killed.”).  Because the reader has been persuaded 
by the narrative to be disgusted by Mundt and to see Leamas as the hero, such an ending 
cannot be called a resolution because it is so profoundly unsettling. See id.
77. See generally Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 254 (1992) (noting the conceptual difficulty in knowing that which is external to us).
 78. JOHN LE CARRÉ, CALL FOR THE DEAD 30–31 (Walker & Co. 1962) (1961). 
79. See, e.g., KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 197 (noting the key attributes of
“[p]ostmodern crime fiction” as “tonal complexity[,] . . . rejection of ancient traditions of 
certain knowledge, assured identity and detective-centered moral authority”); Robin 
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1988) (observing that “[l]iberal
legalists . . . describe an inner life enlivened by freedom and autonomy from the separate
other, and threatened by the danger of annihilation by him,” but that “[c]ritical
legal theorists, by contrast, tell a story of inner lives dominated by feelings of alienation 
and isolation from the separate other, and enlivened by the possibility of association and 
community with him”). 
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[A]ccording to the critical theorist, what [the] material state of separation existentially
entails is not a perpetual celebration of autonomy, but rather, a perpetual longing for
community, or attachment, or unification, or connection.  The separate individual 
strives to connect with the “other” from whom he is separate.  The separate 
individual lives in a state of perpetual dread not of annihilation by the other, but 
of the alienation, loneliness, and existential isolation that his material separation
from the other imposes upon him.  The individual strives through love, work, 
and government to achieve a unification with the other, the natural world, and the 
society from which he was originally and continues to be existentially separated.80 
So, then exists the metaphorical struggle with identity in the espionage novel.
By attaching grave consequences—in espionage novels, global political
consequences—to the failure to correctly identify another, the spy story 
allows us to examine, in amplified volume, a question that is central to 
our daily lives.  Errors about identity mean that we are acting without the 
guidance and comfort that knowledge affords; they are a source of 
anxiety because we are made to see that the risk of error is significant, 
and we are loath to err in matters of great importance.81  Like with other
artistic explorations of aspects of the human experience, there is a
cathartic aspect to the fictional exaggeration of these stakes in the form
of the spy and his double identity; surely, no ordinary individual can
have as much to lose by being wrong as Leamas, Mundt, and Fiedler.82 
The ability to manage the anxiety associated with these fictional 
 80. West, supra note 79, at 9–10; see also Patterson, supra note 77, at 271–77 
(contending that “[l]anguage is the central preoccupation of contemporary
philosophy,” and that “[t]he postmodern conception of individuality casts the individual 
not as the subject in control of discourse, but as an artifact produced by discourse,” so
that “identities can come into being and dissolve depending on the concrete practices that 
constitute them”).  For a literary expression of this theme, see E.M. FORSTER, HOWARDS 
END 167–73 (Alistair M. Duckworth ed., Bedford Books 1997) (1910) (depicting the 
character Margaret who invokes the metaphorical refrain “only connect,” saying, “That 
was the whole of her sermon.  Only connect the prose and the passion, and both will be
exalted, and human love will be seen at its highest.  Live in fragments no longer.  Only
connect, and the beast and the monk, robbed of the isolation that is life to either, will 
die”).
81. See WINKS, supra note 11, at 103–04 (writing about Jorge Luis Borges’s Tlön,
Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, Winks describes “the sense of mirror-menace so central to spy 
fiction, since it presupposes the existence of a secret organization that is spreading either
true knowledge or, more likely, fictitious impressions, which when accepted will change 
the entirety of man’s recording of his activity on earth”). 
82. The reader is assured that whoever is believed will live; whoever is disbelieved
will be shot. See LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 194 (“‘Who will they shoot now?’  Liz 
asked quickly.  ‘After the trial?’  ‘Leamas,’ [the prison guard] replied indifferently, ‘and 
the Jew, Fiedler.’  Liz thought for a moment she was going to fall but her hand found the 
back of a chair and she managed to sit down.”). 
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international political identity shifts makes daily uncertainties more 
bearable.
But if, as this paper claims, one of law’s fundamental functions is to
ascertain truth through mechanisms like trials, this representation of 
life’s factual uncertainties deeply undermines confidence in that aspect
of law.  The consequences that attach to the determination of truth— 
guilt and innocence, compensation and punishment—cannot enjoy the 
kind of public trust and acceptance that they once did if their predicate is
so uncertain.83  Moreover, when good and evil actors can be mistaken
for one another and the acts of one can be attributed to another, it is 
vastly more difficult to condemn or justify either.84 
The inability to determine facts with certainty, then, necessarily raises 
fundamental questions about law’s legitimacy because errors in the
factual findings that underlie legal consequences thereby invalidate those 
consequences.85  Accordingly, doubts about factual accuracy cannot be
confined to the episodes themselves but instead spill over into the larger 
political arena of law’s legitimacy.  This becomes plainer still when one 
considers law’s other important function: to embody the moral norms of 
the culture for which it speaks.86 
The incapacity to know for certain the truth of an event or the identity
of another also exposes its terrifying corollary: understanding that we are
essentially alone.  Without clear guidance about who is trustworthy and 
who is duplicitous, life is a solitary journey fraught with constant risk of 
betrayal.87  The life of the spy is a fictional exaggeration of this state of 
83. See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 21, at 1359 (“The aim of the factfinding process 
is not to generate mathematically ‘probable’ verdicts, but rather to generate acceptable 
ones . . . .”). 
84. See infra Part IV (discussing The Spy Who Came in from the Cold: either he is
targeting Mundt and law acts for good, or he is, in fact, targeting Fiedler, in which case 
law acts for evil and destroys the innocent).
85. One notorious example is the repeated exoneration, through DNA and other
forensic tools, of those convicted of capital crimes, which resulted in the wholesale 
commutation of death sentences by a sitting governor. See Governor Clears Illinois 
Death Row, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2003, 10:27 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
2649125.stm (reporting that Governor George Ryan of Illinois had commuted the death 
sentences of all Illinois prisoners, three years after imposing a moratorium on capital 
sentences, because of the concern that “the Illinois death penalty system is arbitrary and 
capricious—and therefore immoral.”).  More subtle ambiguities of fact are endemic to
the trial process and result in corresponding concerns about the validity of the judgments 
upon which they rest.  See, e.g., Cavallaro, supra note 44, at 850–51 (noting that 
contemporary scholarship recognizes that differences in perception may flow from
differences in gender, race, and culture).
86. See infra Part IV. 
87. In the novels of le Carré, the betrayals are both personal and professional, from 
the mole of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, to the affairs of Smiley’s high-born wife Ann:
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isolation, and le Carré describes it powerfully in the enduring metaphor
of his title, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold.  As Control explains to
Leamas early in the novel:
“We have to live without sympathy, don’t we?  That’s impossible of course. 
We act it to one another, all this hardness; but we aren’t like that really, I
mean . . . one can’t be out in the cold all the time; one has to come in from the
cold . . . d’you see what I mean?”88 
Control asks Leamas to participate in the mission to bring Mundt down, 
continuing the metaphor: “‘I want you to stay out in the cold a little 
longer,’” Control says.89 The implication is that, when the mission is
completed, there will be an end to the alienation and isolation of the
spy’s life; in fact, the narrative denies this relief to both Leamas and the 
reader, instead reinforcing the persistent anxiety and dread that
accompanies it.90 
The counterpoint to the isolation of the spy’s life91 is the “warmth” of 
human connection and intimacy, which Leamas finds with Liz.  Leamas 
comes to realize this during his prolonged debriefing in Holland:
both are constructed on the premise that we can never really know one another or the 
truth.  As Robin Winks puts it, “the spy, amateur or professional, must move alone, all society
set against him, perhaps even his own control betraying him.”  WINKS, supra note 11, at 
51. 
 88. LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 14 (ellipses in original).  Control explicates this 
idea further when Leamas agrees to kill Mundt, saying, “‘I mean in our world we pass so
quickly out of the register of hate or love—like certain sounds a dog can’t hear.  All 
that’s left in the end is a kind of nausea; you never want to cause suffering again.’” Id. at
17.  The irony is that Control conveys empathy for Leamas that his actions belie entirely:
Control has no intention of allowing Leamas to act on his own hatred of Mundt because
Mundt is too valuable an agent.  Instead, Control uses Leamas to achieve an antithetical 
result at great human cost. 
89. Id. at 14. 
90. Leamas, “a man permanently isolated in his deceit,” explains:
In itself, the practice of deception is not particularly exacting; it is a matter of
experience, of professional expertise, it is a facility most of us can acquire. 
But while a confidence trickster, a play-actor or a gambler can return from his 
performance to the ranks for his admirers, the secret agent enjoys no such 
relief.  For him, deception is first a matter of self-defence.  He must protect 
himself not only from without but from within, and against the most natural of
impulses; . . . though he be an affectionate husband and father, he must under 
all circumstances withhold himself from those in whom he should naturally
confide. 
Id. at 120. 
91. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (“To everyone he meets he stays a 
stranger . . . Secret agent man . . . They’ve given you a number and taken away your
name.”).
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There was a girl standing on the beach throwing bread to the seagulls.  Her back
was turned to him.  The sea wind played with her long black hair and pulled at 
her coat, making an arc of her body, like a bow strung towards the sea.  He 
knew what it was then that Liz had given him; the thing that he would have to 
go back and find if he ever got home to England: it was the caring about little 
things—the faith in ordinary life; the simplicity that made you break up a bit of
bread into a paper bag, walk down to the beach and throw it to the gulls.  It was
this respect for triviality which he had never been allowed to possess; whether it 
was bread for the seagulls or love, whatever it was he would go back and find it; 
he would make Liz find it for him.92 
In the final scene of the novel, after Leamas realizes the depth of
betrayal he has experienced at the hands of Control and his other bosses,
he chooses death over this degree of isolation.93  For Leamas, it is not
possible to “come in from the cold,” so complete is his alienation from a 
life of feeling and intimacy, and from his authentic self.94  And the final
cruelty of The Spy Who Came in from the Cold is that Control exploits
Leamas’s human need for connection and love—his feelings for Liz—to
guarantee the safety and continued utility of Mundt.95  As Liz explains, 
“‘It’s far more terrible, what they are doing; to find the humanity in
 92. LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 85. 
93. Id. at 212 (describing George Smiley who can be heard from the western side
of the wall calling for Leamas to jump after shots ring out).  Le Carré writes: 
Shielding his eyes [Leamas] looked down at the foot of the wall and at last he
managed to see her, lying still. For a moment he hesitated, then quite slowly
he climbed back down the same rungs, until he was standing beside her.  She 
was dead; her face was turned away, her black hair drawn across her cheek as 
if to protect her from the rain. 
Id.; see also West, supra note 79, at 12 (“Subjectively, and in spite of the dominant 
culture’s insistence to the contrary, we long to establish some sort of human connection 
with the other in order to overcome the pain of isolation and alienation which our 
separateness engenders.”). 
In this respect, Leamas is in the tradition of the hard-boiled detective, about whom 
Robin Winks writes, “[B]ehind the facade of toughness is someone sentimental enough 
to care about both truth and people, though truth comes first.”  WINKS, supra note 11, at 
99. 
94. See CAWELTI & ROSENBERG, supra note 12, at 32 (describing the metaphor of
“the cold” as twentieth century alienation of the individual); id. at 20–21 (discussing how 
the labile identity of the spy leads to extraordinary isolation and even paranoia, with no
one to trust and no community of which to be a part); see also PANEK, supra note 14, at 
238 (“For Le Carré, man is essentially an isolated, undefined entity, existing in a world
which is terribly difficult but one in which identity is possible on a number of levels.”). 
Thus, Leamas’s estrangement from the nameless wife and children of his past.  See LE 
CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 10. 
95. In the final scene before the tribunal, Mundt’s lawyer, Karden, mocks Leamas’s
human need for intimacy saying, “‘Leamas had done the one thing British Intelligence 
had never expected him to do: he had taken a girl and wept on her shoulder.’  Then
Karden laughed quietly, as if it were all such a neat joke.”  LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 
182. 
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people, in me and whoever else they use, to turn it like a weapon in their 
hands, and use it to hurt and kill . . .’”96 
Additionally destabilizing is the perception, fueled by the work of le
Carré, that although individuals cannot comprehend the truth of events 
or identities, the authoritarian state knows everything about us.  Even as 
we are cut off from the comfort of knowledge and certainty, the novelist
generates additional anxiety in the reader by imagining a regime—on
both sides of the Iron Curtain—in which we cannot conceal even the 
most intimate emotional details of our lives from an all-knowing
bureaucracy.  As Leamas explains to Liz the plot by which Mundt
destroyed Fiedler and saved himself, Liz asks, “‘But how could they
know about me; how could they know we would come together?  . . . 
Heavens above, Alec, can they even tell when people will fall in 
love?’”97  This image suggests a state in which intimacy is impossible
because the privacy it requires is also impossible.  And although the
Cold War generated images of such a state on the Soviet side of The
Wall,98 le Carré’s purpose in The Spy Who Came in from the Cold is to
demonstrate that intrusion into our intimate lives is a function of modern 
life and occurs with equal frequency in the West.99 
Le Carré depicts the intelligence bureaucracy’s knowledge as 
detached, unemotional, perfect.  He never tells us Control’s real, human
name but instead allows it to evoke a generic and fearful authoritarianism.100 
He uses the term London for the collection of unnamed individuals who 
hatch the plot by which Leamas is deceived: “‘Fiedler was too powerful
for Mundt to eliminate alone, so London decided to do it for him.  I can 
see them working it out, they’re so damned academic; I can see them
96. Id. at 204 (ellipsis in the original).  She continues, “‘[T]hey’re more wicked
than all of us. . . .  Because of their contempt, . . . contempt for what is real and good; contempt 
for love, contempt for . . .’” Id. (final ellipsis in the original).
97. Id. at 201. 
98. For example, Liz’s wardress tells Liz that the prisoners housed there are 
“‘[e]nemies of the state, . . . [s]pies, agitators,’” and when asked how she knows they are 
spies, the wardress replies “‘The Party knows.  The Party knows more about people than 
they know themselves.  Haven’t you been told that?’” Id. at 193. 
99. Indeed, at an earlier point in the novel, Control mentions Liz, and Leamas 
responds: “‘I don’t want her brought into this.’”  Id. at 46.  Control’s reply is disingenuous: 
“‘Why should she be?’  Control asked sharply and for a moment, just for a moment, 
Leamas thought he had penetrated the veneer of academic detachment.  ‘Who suggested she 
should be?’” Id.
100. The choice of the sobriquet “Control,” of course, evokes oppressive domination.
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sitting around a fire in one of their smart bloody clubs.’”101  This yin and
yang depiction of “knowledge as elusive for individuals but comprehensive 
when collected against individuals” defines a state in which totalitarianism 
is inevitable. 
For Ian Fleming’s James Bond, the game of identity generates not 
anxiety but amusement.  Unlike le Carré, Fleming’s spy is not tormented
by doubt and confusion; but neither is he real in the sense that Leamas 
appears real to the reader.  Instead, Bond is an impossible cartoon,102 an 
agglomeration of traits that no real individual possesses.103  His  
adventures with identity do not create anxiety because the tone of the 
novels assures us there will be no unpleasant surprises. 
Indeed, everything about Bond’s identity is transparent, even blatant: 
his expensive tastes in brand-name clothing, cars, and food; his 
superhuman strength; and his extraordinary appeal to the opposite sex 
 101. LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 200.  The “smart bloody clubs” reference is one of 
many by which le Carré associates powerful state actors with the class hierarchy of 
British society.  Many of his novels are concerned with the link between the public 
school/Oxford/Cambridge educated elite and the British Intelligence Service. See
generally  LE CARRÉ, HONOURABLE SCHOOLBOY, supra note 17 (using a title metaphor
that evokes a character defined by a moral from the bygone world of British public 
schools); LE CARRÉ, TINKER, supra note 17 (depicting relationships among the loyal and
double agents that are formed at a boys’ boarding school).  Leamas is, by contrast, very
much not of that world: le Carré says that “[i]f he were to walk into a London club the 
porter would certainly not mistake him for a member . . . .  He looked like a man who
could make trouble, a man who looked after his money, a man who was not quite a 
gentleman.”  LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 10.  When Liz asks Leamas, “‘[W]hat do you 
believe in?’,” he replies sarcastically, “‘I believe an eleven bus will take me to Hammersmith.  
I don’t believe it’s driven by Father Christmas.’  [Liz presses,] ‘You must believe in 
something,’ [and Leamas replies,] ‘I don’t like Americans and public schools.  I don’t 
like military parades and people who play soldiers.’” Id. at 30; see also id. at 12 (“[Leamas 
describes Control as] shorter than Leamas remembered him: otherwise, just the same.
The same affected detachment, the same donnish conceits; the same horror of draughts; 
courteous according to a formula miles removed from Leamas’ experience.  The same
milk-and-water smile, the same elaborate diffidence, the same apologetic adherence to a
code of behaviour which he pretended to find ridiculous.  The same banality.”). 
102. For some critics, this aspect of Fleming’s novels is an occasion for criticism.
See, e.g., PANEK, supra note 14, at 201 (“[Fleming] fails to render more than cartoon 
reality in his characters, either major or minor.”).
103. See id. at 207 (“Bond is the essential clubman, intent on comforting rituals of
dress and consumption . . . .”).  These rituals of etiquette might be seen as filling the void 
left when moral standards of a more enduring kind seem to have crumbled. 
At least one critic has suggested that “the growth of Bond as a mythical figure, with its 
accompaniments of brand-name shirts, shoes, drinks, cigarettes, games, came after the immense
success of the first Bond film made in 1962, two years before Fleming’s death.” 
SYMONS, supra note 3, at 224. 
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are all unwavering aspects of his iconic character.104  His identity is so 
fixed as to defy contemporary experience, providing a consoling antidote 
to the anxiety associated with shifting and ambiguous identity.  The 
certitude of his character is a touchstone for and counterpoint to the 
existential doubt that has come to define late twentieth century fiction 
and philosophy.  But this certitude must operate in the realm of fantasy.105 
As Julian Symons puts it, “He was a perfect pipe-dream figure for 
organization man, because he was an organization man too, but unlike
the standard model, he was individually powerful.  He could act, he 
could destroy, he appeared to be free.”106  Bond’s unlikely clarity of self 
serves only to underscore the reality of our experience: that, unlike
Bond, we can never really be sure about the identity of another.
When Bond is allowed, briefly, to doubt his role as a professional
assassin, he is quickly reined in and assured that his is the side of
unambiguous good against evil.  As Umberto Eco writes: 
The difference between good and evil—is it really something neat, recognizable, as
the hagiography of counterespionage would like us to believe?  At this point, 
Bond is ripe for the crisis, for the salutary recognition of universal ambiguity, 
and he sets off along the route traversed by the protagonist of le Carré.  But at 
the very moment he questions himself about the appearance of the devil and, 
sympathizing with the Enemy, is inclined to recognize him as a “lost brother,”
Bond is treated to a salve from Mathis [an American colleague]: “When you get 
back to London you will find there are other Le Chiffres [the villain of Casino
Royale] seeking to destroy you and your friends and your country. . . .  [A]nd 
you will go after them to destroy them in order to protect yourself and the people
you love. . . .  Surround yourself with human beings, my dear James.  They are 
104. See CAWELTI & ROSENBERG, supra note 12, at 128 (“[Bond is] ‘an expression .
. . of the prime myth of the British upperclass, the delusion that it is a genuine elite, 
distinguished by an “effortless superiority.”  It does everything better, with no trouble, 
than the lower orders do with great effort.’” (quoting Joan Rockwell, Normative
Attitudes of Spies in Fiction, in MASS CULTURE REVISITED 325, 331 (Bernard Rosenberg 
& David Manning White eds., 1971))); PANEK, supra note 14, at 207 (“One of the most
remarked upon features of Bond’s characterization is his fastidious adherence to personal 
custom and etiquette.  He always smokes Morelands, he always drinks vodka martinis, 
he always wears a black knit tie . . . .”); WINKS, supra note 11, at 53 (describing James 
Bond as “Ian Fleming’s walking set of brand names”). 
 105. CAWELTI & ROSENBERG, supra note 12, at 148 (“[T]here is always an edge of
irony and burlesque in [Fleming’s] style and in his inventions.”); PANEK, supra note 14, 
at 236 (contrasting the “fantasies of Fleming” with le Carré’s portrayals of “an enervated 
Britain reeling from its fall from international power and its own internal problems”).
 106. SYMONS, supra note 3, at 224.  As Symons explains, “Into the British post-war
atmosphere of virtuous puritanism he brought a celebration of physical pleasures,
including those of sadism and masochism.” Id. at 223–24. 
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easier to fight for than principles. . . .  But don’t let me down and become human 
yourself.  We would lose such a wonderful machine.”107  
Unlike le Carré, Fleming does not depict a “discrepancy between the 
agent’s goals and those of his control.”108 British intelligence in Fleming’s
work is consistently on the side of the good, and evil is depicted with 
equal clarity and consistency.109  The villains in the Bond novels tend to
be cartoonish as well: Dr. No, Goldfinger, and others, as one critic puts 
it, “All have crashed their ways into the Gentleman’s Club, but they do 
not belong—they are as common as linoleum.”110  Often the villain has
exaggerated physical traits, like obesity, baldness, or other grotesque
elements of physiognomy.111  Often, too, the villain plays a broad ethnic
stereotype in sharp contrast to the pure English of Bond’s persona.112 
These caricatures are in marked contrast to the world of le Carré, in 
 107. Umberto Eco, Narrative Structures in Fleming, in  THE POETICS OF MURDER:
DETECTIVE FICTION AND LITERARY THEORY 93, 95 (Glen W. Most & William W. Stowe
eds., 1983) (quoting IAN FLEMING, CASINO ROYALE 137–38 (Berkeley Books 1982)
(1953)).  Eco goes on to explain that with these words, 
Bond is to abandon the treacherous life of moral meditation and of 
psychological anger, with all the neurotic dangers that they entail. . . .  From 
that moment Bond does not meditate upon truth and justice, upon life and
death, except in rare moments of boredom, usually in the bar of an airport but 
always in the form of a casual daydream, never allowing himself to be infected
by doubt . . . . 
Id. at 95–96. 
 108. DAVID MONAGHAN, THE NOVELS OF JOHN LE CARRÉ: THE ART OF SURVIVAL
106–07 (1985). 
109. Eco writes about how Fleming exploits classic structures of mythology in his 
Bond stories, with a set of dichotomies including the hero/villain dichotomy with “all the 
characteristics of the opposition between Eros and Thanatos,” and says:
Thus arises the suspicion that our author does not characterize his creations in
such and such a manner as a result of an ideological opinion but purely for
rhetorical purposes.  By “rhetoric” I mean an art of persuasion which relies on
endoxa, that is, on the common opinions shared by the majority of readers. 
Fleming is, in other words, cynically building an effective narrative apparatus.
Eco, supra note 107, at 114. 
 110. PANEK, supra note 14, at 208–09 (noting how Bond’s enemies are “nouveau
riche slobs . . . [who] cheat at cards”).  Panek also observes that the villains of Fleming’s 
novels “are more gangster than political antagonist.”  Id. at 205; see also SYMONS, supra
note 3, at 223 (noting that “[a]s Kingsley Amis has pointed out, ‘throughout all Bond’s 
adventures nobody English does anything evil,’” and that “to use foreigners as villains 
was merely ‘a convention older than our literature’”). 
111. See, e.g., FLEMING, THUNDERBALL, supra note 15, at 48 (depicting the villain,
Ernst Stavro Blofeld, as obese: “Nothing about Blofeld was small”).
112. See, e.g., IAN FLEMING, LIVE AND LET DIE 18 (Berkeley Books 1982) (1954)
(depicting the villain, Mr. Big, as a Haitian man who “had been initiated into Voodoo as 
a child”); see also CAWELTI & ROSENBERG, supra note 12, at 128–29 (“Where the hero is 
pure Anglo-Saxon, the villain is invariably from an ‘inferior’ race or some curious racial 
mixture.”). 
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which ambiguity and duality are ever-present and there is “little or no 
moral distinction between hero and supposed villain.”113 
III. LAW AS ORDERING RELATIONS BETWEEN
INDIVIDUAL AND STATE 
Another central function of law is to order relations between the 
individual, or a collection of individuals, and the state.  In the history of 
detective fiction, this aspect of law is plainly on display.  Detective fiction 
has permitted exploration of the expectations and attitudes of a society
toward the legal institutions that it has constructed for itself.114 
In the law and order narratives of the classic or golden age of Christie, 
Sayers, and others, law is a benevolent force that reliably restores order 
to a community whenever a rogue individual has sought to undermine 
it.115  The state is a construct that is ordered by law and that allows
individuals to thrive under its protective mantle.116  The function of law
in the mysteries of the classic era is to determine who the aberrant
 113. MONAGHAN, supra note 108, at 107.  Monaghan observes that, in le Carré’s 
novels, the “heroes either fall short of the goal of their mission, are killed, or, having 
been made aware of the humanity of their antagonist, are dissatisfied with their success.” 
Id. at 108. 
114. These expectations and attitudes about a culture’s legal institutions and
precepts are not only time specific, but also culture specific: the detective fiction of a 
Sicilian novelist like Andrea Camilleri presents a legal culture quite different from that
of the Swedish police procedurals of Henning Mankell’s Kurt Wallander. See, e.g., 
ANDREA CAMILLERI, EXCURSION TO TINDARI (Stephen Sartarelli trans., Penguin Books 
2005) (2000); HENNING MANKELL, FACELESS KILLERS (Steven T. Murray trans., Vintage 
Books 2003) (1991).  These cultural variations provide one of the pleasures of a broad reading 
of detective fiction.  See generally Clive James, Blood on the Borders: Crime Fiction
from All Over, NEW YORKER, Apr. 9, 2007, at 91, 93 (observing that “[i]n most of the 
crime novels coming out now, it’s a matter not of what happens but of where,” and that
“[e]ssentially, they are guidebooks”).
115. Indeed, in the Golden Age detective stories with which we are so familiar, law 
is a comforting presence that restores not only order in general but class hierarchy in 
particular.  The peculiarly English upstairs/downstairs dynamic of most of these novels
operates to reify the class structure and privilege of the pre-War period, long after many
of those hierarchies had begun, in reality, to erode.  See, e.g., D.A. MILLER, THE NOVEL
AND THE POLICE 36–39, 45–46 (1988) (observing these dynamics in the work of Wilkie 
Collins).  In that respect, law in these fictional narratives is unambiguously benign in its 
operation on individuals; only the guilty are punished, and there is no doubt about their
moral dessert by novel’s end. 
116. In these narratives, law also operates to foster class hierarchies that are depicted as
benevolent.  Often, the deviant actor in the story is one who seeks to challenge or upend these
established relations between classes.  See, e.g., id. at 40–41. 
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members are and to expel them from the community through the 
institutions and procedures of law enforcement and justice. 
In the world of hard-boiled detective fiction, there is an embattled
relation between the individual detective and the corrupt bureaucracy of 
law enforcement.117  This problematic relation reflects a growing attitude
of mistrust of legal actors and institutions in a society in which those 
institutions burgeoned quickly and appeared to intrude into many aspects 
of the social order.118  The fundamental premise of the classic detective
novels—that even if individual police officers were occasionally
imperfect or even incompetent,119 law acted with benevolent neutrality
to restore order and hierarchy120—was no longer an accepted norm.
Detectives like Philip Marlowe and Sam Spade emerged as individuals
who mistrust not only the bad guys but also the good guys—police 
officers and police departments that were “on the take,” judicial systems
that permitted or facilitated “frame-ups,” and lawmakers who were more 
interested in reelection and the perks of power than in the community
they were paid to serve.121  This was a very different expression of the
117. See generally  MCCANN, supra note 9 (discussing how “hard-boiled crime 
fiction” became “a complaint against social corruption,” which writers indicated “was part of
a moral struggle against dishonesty”).  The problematic relation between individual and state
is a hallmark of the hard-boiled mystery and reflects a growing attitude of mistrust of 
legal actors and institutions.  See, e.g., PORTER, supra note 2, at 197–98 (noting how in 
hard-boiled fiction “the victims are ordinary citizens who have recourse neither to their
political leaders nor to the law because both politics and law enforcement are part of the 
corrupt system”); George Grella, The Hard-Boiled Detective Novel, in  DETECTIVE
FICTION: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 103, 111 (Robin W. Winks ed., 1980) (“In
the devastated society of the hard-boiled novel, crime is not a temporary aberration, but a 
ubiquitous fact.”). 
118. See id. at 105. 
119. See, e.g., SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE ADVENTURE OF THE NORWOOD
BUILDER (1903), reprinted in THE RETURN OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 39, 43–44, 48, 60 (The 
Mysterious Press 1987) (describing how Inspector Lestrade errs in concluding prematurely,
and gloating with certainty, that Holmes’s client has committed murder, but
later acknowledges his error). 
120. See SYMONS, supra note 3, at 21 (“[W]hat crime literature offered to its readers 
for half a century from 1890 onwards was a reassuring world in which those who tried to
disturb the established order were always discovered and punished.”). 
121. See, e.g., CHANDLER, THE BIG SLEEP, supra note 6, at 113–14; Grella, supra
note 117, at 106 (“The private detective always finds the police incompetent, brutal, or 
corrupt, and therefore works alone.”). As George Grella observes, “Criminals and
policemen are not the only moral offenders; culpability often begins at the highest social 
levels.”  Grella, supra note 117, at 111; see also PORTER, supra note 2, at 198 (“The big 
house, that enduring symbol of social stability through hierarchical order in the British 
tradition, takes in Chandler the form of the Sternwood mansion (The Big Sleep) . . . .
The ostentations luxury of the decor serves chiefly to point up the ironic contrast with 
the moral corruption of the inhabitants.”).
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relationship between the individual and the legal system than had 
undergirded the fiction of Christie, Sayers, and others. 
Espionage fiction takes this relation to another level.  The ironic
skepticism of the hard-boiled detective is further deepened to a depiction 
of the state as a terrifying entity so estranged from the individual and the 
individual’s needs as to be malevolent; the individual, even a savvy 
player like Leamas the career spy, is its vulnerable prey.122  Here, law is
no benevolent or consoling force but is instead a juggernaut of 
authoritarian abuse whose theoretical commitment to the rights of the 
individual has become so remote as to be indiscernible.123  As Leamas  
puts it in the final hours of the novel:
“Oh Liz,” he said desperately, “for God’s sake believe me.  I hate it, I hate it all; 
I’m tired.  But it’s the world, it’s mankind that’s gone mad.  We’re a tiny price 
to pay . . . but everywhere’s the same, people cheated and misled, whole lives
thrown away, people shot and in prison, whole groups and classes of men
written off for nothing.  And you, your party—God knows it was built on the 
bodies of ordinary people.  You’ve never seen men die as I have, Liz . . .”124 
Le Carré’s protagonists are deeply skeptical about the motives and 
goals of the state, as they witness public authorities like Control
committing the most serious wrongs for some ostensible public good.125 
Leamas’s recognition of the state’s malevolent abuse of power— 
represented by Liz’s death at the hands of the East German police— 
impels him to climb back down to the Eastern side of the Wall to meet 
122. Throughout most of the novel, Leamas appears to the reader as a man in
control of events, but we learn at the conclusion that we have been grossly misled and 
that, instead, Leamas is a pawn in a battle between nation-states and that the risks that he
has accepted are far greater than he has understood.  See LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 205
(“[Leamas explains to Liz,] ‘We’re a tiny price to pay . . . but everywhere’s the same, 
people cheated and misled, whole lives thrown away, people shot and in prison, whole 
groups and classes of men written off for nothing.’” (ellipsis in original)). 
 123. As Liz explains to Leamas: 
“You don’t understand.  You don’t want to.  You’re trying to persuade yourself.  
It’s far more terrible, what they [the British] are doing; to find the humanity in 
people, in me and whoever else they use, to turn it like a weapon in their 
hands, and use it to hurt and kill . . .” 
Id. at 204 (ellipsis in original).
124. Id. at 205 (ellipses in original).
125. See id. at 199 (“[Leamas tells Liz,] ‘We are witnessing the lousy end to a 
filthy, lousy operation to save Mundt’s skin. To save him from a clever little Jew in his 
own department who had begun to suspect the truth.  They made us kill him, d’you see,
kill the Jew.  Now you know, and God help us both.’”). 
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his death beside her.126  She has already been sacrificed by Control to an 
end that is hardly an obvious good: protecting and preserving the anti-
Semitic killer Mundt.127 
In this narrative, the state, so far from providing a protective mantle to 
individual citizens, uses and disposes of them, raising disturbing
questions about the purpose of law.  The long-accepted liberal premise 
that law operates through state institutions to preserve and protect
individual rights and autonomy128 is turned on its head when Liz is
hailed into East Germany to be used against her deep feelings of attachment 
to Leamas,129 and Leamas is placed at risk while being kept in the dark 
as to the true object of his mission.130  Ironically, this treatment of Liz
and Leamas is all in the name of preserving England against the scourge 
of a totalitarian socialist state, whose iconic attributes are those to which
Liz and Leamas are subjected by their own government.
The state, in this depiction, is created and empowered by law; it has all
the information and withholds it from individuals based upon the covert 
utilitarian calculations of a few and at an extraordinary moral cost.131  In
addition, in this representation, the State has become estranged from the
individual and mechanistic in its enforcement of norms that are unlinked
to fundamental human moral norms.132  Although the East German State
is held up to derision for its statist control of employment, residence, and 
even food supplies, in the end it is the British power elite whose control
126. See id. at 212 (“For a moment he hesitated, then quite slowly he climbed back
down the same rungs, until he was standing beside her.”). 
127. See id. at 199 (“‘We are witnessing the lousy end to a filthy, lousy operation to 
save Mundt’s skin.’”). 
128. See, e.g., Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A
View from Century’s End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999) (describing the “Master 
Paradigm” of Liberalism, “the larger system of belief within which the others all arise,” as
espousing a belief that “the proper role of the state is to protect the rights of . . . individuals 
and to provide a mechanism for the mediation for . . . their conflicting desires”).
129. See LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 175–85 (describing Liz’s appearance before 
the tribunal and noting that “[s]he didn’t know whether to lie, that was the terrible
thing. . . .  She couldn’t lie unless she knew what was at stake; she would fumble on and
Alec would die—for there was no doubt in her mind that Leamas was in danger”). 
130. The one thing Leamas particularly asks is that Liz not be part of the mission;
he says to Control, “I just want her left alone . . . .  I just don’t want her to be messed
about.  I don’t want her to have a file or anything.  I want her forgotten.”  Id. at 47.  This
is the opposite of what Control in fact does. 
131. These costs include the accepted deaths of Leamas’s network of agents, of 
Fiedler, and even of Liz and Leamas, as well as the resultant triumph of an amoral killer, 
Mundt. 
132. See infra Part IV. 
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of information and cynical manipulation of human feelings of love and 
protectiveness appears devastatingly inhumane and amoral.133 
What the state, through law, does operate to preserve, le Carré suggests, is
a crude subsistence existence that mirrors the East Germany of popular
imagination134 and is depicted through Leamas’s “cover” identity as a 
drone laborer in an obscure library.135 Although it is a safe life, the work
is menial and mind-numbing,136 and provides only enough income for
both Leamas and Liz to live in bare poverty, in tiny flats, eating the 
cheapest food.137  Moreover, the workplace is presented as a scale
replica of the relation of authoritarian state to citizen, with a boss who is, 
without explanation, arbitrary, inhumane, and demeaning.138 The
employees work in alienated silence; even when they somehow manage
to forge a connection, it is impersonal, anonymous.139  Liz appears 
desperate to find meaning first by joining “the Party” and imagining a 
133. See, e.g., LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 77 (“[Upon learning that the lover of one
of his agents had been murdered in West Berlin, Leamas muses,] ‘He wondered why
Control had never told him Elvira had been murdered. . . .  It was useless speculating. Control 
had his reasons; they were usually so bloody tortuous it took you a week to work them out.’”). 
134. See id. at 151–53 (describing Liz’s visit to an East German party meeting). 
135. See id. at 24–29 (describing Leamas’s work in the library). 
136. Liz explains, “It’s just a question of checking that all the books are in the 
shelves. . . . When you’ve checked you pencil in the new reference and mark it off on 
the index.”  Id. at 25. 
137. Le Carré says of Leamas’s flat: 
[It] was small and squalid, done in brown paint with photographs of Clovelly.  
It looked directly on to the grey backs of three stone warehouses, the windows 
of which were drawn, for aesthetic reasons, in creosote.  Above the warehouse 
there lived an Italian family, quarrelling at night and beating carpets in the 
morning.  Leamas had few possessions with which to brighten his rooms.  He 
bought some shades to cover the light bulbs, and two pairs of sheets to replace 
the hessian squares provided by the landlord.  The rest Leamas tolerated: the 
flower pattern curtains, not lined or hemmed, the fraying brown carpets and the 
clumsy darkwood furniture, like something from a seamen’s hostel.  From a 
yellow, crumbling geyser he obtained hot water for a shilling. 
Id. at 21. 
138. See id. at 26–28 (describing Leamas’s supervisor, Ms. Crail, who upbraids him 
for bringing his shopping bags into the library and for putting his coat on her peg; Leamas 
“[h]ad become the enemy of Miss Crail, and enemies were what Miss Crail liked.  Either 
she scowled at him or she ignored him.”). 
139. See id. at 29 (“[Liz] always knew that there was something deeply wrong with 
Leamas, and that one day, for some reason she could not understand, he might break and 
she would never see him again.”).
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utopian alternative to her own shabby loneliness,140 then by inviting the
silent and sullen Leamas to dinner at her flat, just “a bed-sitting-room
and a kitchen,” with “two armchairs, a divan bed, and a bookcase full of 
paper-back books.”141  There, in her domestic enclave, she struggles to
make a personal connection to Leamas, questioning him about his 
beliefs, only to be rebuffed by his brusque sarcasm and refusal to 
divulge anything about his past: 
“You must believe in something,” she persisted: “something like God—I 
know you do, Alec; you’ve got that look sometimes, as if you’d got something
special to do, like a priest.  Alec, don’t smile, it’s true.” 
  He shook his head. 
“Sorry, Liz, you’ve got it wrong.  I don’t like Americans and public schools. 
I don’t like military parades and people who play soldiers.”  Without smiling he
added, “And I don’t like conversations about Life.”142 
Despite his tough exterior, however, Leamas does ultimately develop 
protective feelings for Liz, so that when she is made the tool of Leamas’s 
impeachment and exposure before the East German tribunal, we see 
Leamas finally lose his self-control.143  As Mundt’s attorney explains:
“Somewhere . . . in Leamas’ long sojourn in the wilderness, he would have to break
faith with his oath of poverty, drunkenness, degeneracy, above all of solitude. 
He would need a companion, a mistress perhaps; he would long for the warmth
of human contact, long to reveal a part of the other soul within his breast. . . .  Leamas, 
that skilled, experienced operator, made a mistake so elementary, so human that . . .”  
He smiled.144 
Throughout the novel, le Carré draws a sharp contrast between the 
elites who act for the state—Control, Smiley—and the working man for 
whom they purport to act.  The elites enjoy an education, connections, 
and privileges that are unknown to the library workers or the local 
grocer.145  They live in domestic comfort, dining well at home and at
140. See id. at 151 (describing Liz’s visit to Leipzig, “Austerity pleased her—it 
gave her the comfort of sacrifice,” and “[i]t was like living in a religious community . . . .
You felt the world was better for your empty stomach”). 
141. Id. at 29. 
142. Id. at 30 (“[Liz asks Leamas,] ‘Alec, what do you believe in? Don’t laugh— 
tell me,’ [and he replies,] ‘I believe an eleven bus will take me to Hammersmith.  I don’t 
believe it’s driven by Father Christmas.’”).
143. See id. at 175 (“[Liz] was interrupted by the sound of movement; the screech 
of furniture forced aside, and Leamas’ voice, hoarse, high-pitched, ugly, filling the room.  
‘You bastards! Leave her alone!’”). 
144. Id. at 171 (final ellipsis in original).
145. See id. at 45 (describing the room in George Smiley’s house where Leamas meets 
with Control: “There were books everywhere. It was a pretty room; tall, with eighteenth-
century mouldings, long windows and a good fireplace”). 
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their country houses and clubs, while Liz struggles to make ends meet.146 
They appear to be married, with children and families, while the workers 
are isolated, lonely, divorced, and alienated even from family.147  Le  
Carré suggests that it is in the state’s interest to perpetuate this schism
between the elite and the working classes to facilitate the paternalistic
“Control.”  This is not the benign social hierarchy that is a source of 
comfort in the upstairs/downstairs country houses of Agatha Christie,
where people happily occupy and know the boundaries of their “place” 
and eagerly enact their roles as servant or benefactor,148 but a darker
vision of a divided and deteriorated society.
If law is designed to order relations among citizens,149 then it is, in this
respect, a failure because the relations established by the legal order
of le Carré’s England are hierarchical, impersonal, and static.  There is
no room for mobility between the classes he describes, and there is little 
incentive for those at the bottom to participate in the social enterprise.150 
As with the phenomenon of identity, this aspect of law promotes
alienation, isolation, and despair. 
Again, Fleming’s Bond appears as a counterpoint to le Carré, offering
a fantastic society of hedonistic pleasure and ever-changing opportunities 
for excitement and adventure.151  There is little in Fleming’s novel to
tell us how the rest of the world lives, but for Bond, surrounded by
luxury goods and beautiful women, the social order cannot be improved.
Bond is permitted to be occasionally flippant with his boss, to exercise 
broad discretion in the completion of his missions, and to enjoy long 
146. See id. at 29 (describing Liz’s flat as “a bed-sitting-room and a kitchen”); id. at
180 (“[During the trial, Karden questions Liz:] ‘How much money do you earn, 
Elizabeth?’  ‘Six pounds a week.’  ‘Have you any savings?’ ‘A little.  A few pounds.’”). 
147. See id. at 10 (“Somewhere long ago there had been a divorce; somewhere there 
were children, now in their teens, who received their allowance from a rather odd private 
bank in the City.”). 
148. See, e.g., CHRISTIE, supra note 37, at 203–07 (discussing the solution to the 
crime, Hercule Poirot explains that “‘the company assembled [on the train] was interesting 
because it was so varied—representing as it did all classes and nationalities,’” which
helped Poirot reach the conclusion that all of them, including the servants of the victim’s
family, conspired to avenge the death of a kidnapped child).
149. See Wetlaufer, supra note 128. 
150. See LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 28 (describing Leamas’s return home from 
work to a flat where the electricity has been cut off for nonpayment). 
151. See, e.g., CAWELTI & ROSENBERG, supra note 12, at 126 (“[Fleming’s Bond is] 
a heroic spy interested in sex and good living, presented with a strong dose of wit and a 
large tongue in the cheek.  One could enjoy this hero’s adventures and affairs without 
being burdened with a heavy load of political and moral seriousness.”). 
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restful breaks between assignments.152  Very little of this autonomy and 
glamour dovetails with the experience of the typical reader or worker in 
the England of Fleming’s generation. Instead, the novels act as an
escapist antidote to a postwar society of limiting divisions and scant
pleasures.153 In this respect, too, Fleming affirms le Carré’s vision of
a dispiriting set of social relations constructed by law. 
IV. LAW AS THE POSITIVE EXPRESSION OF MORAL NORMS
A third aspect of the function of law is as an expression of moral
norms.154 We understand law as an instantiation of those norms
within a particular culture or legal order.  The classic detective story
reinforces law as hierarchy, while also affirming norms whose source is
essentially the Ten Commandments: the edicts that you shall not steal, 
you shall not commit adultery, and you shall not murder are the taboos
that form the essence of classic or golden age mysteries.  Similarly, in the 
hard-boiled detective story, these biblical norms are still well established,
although their violators are more flagrant and their number has grown, so 
that their misconduct is unsurprising, almost acceptable, to all but the 
152. See, e.g., FLEMING, supra note 14, at 003–09 (beginning with Bond returning 
from one such recuperative break). 
153. For a description of the postwar hardships of England, see History of England, 
The 20th Century, http://www.britannia.com/history/nar20hist5.html (last visited July 22,
2010) (“Stringent financial measures, imposed to meet the enormous war debt, caused
undue hardship that was only made worse by one of the worst winters on record, 
monstrous gales and floods wiped out farms and destroyed agricultural products.  A fuel 
shortage severely curtailed exports, food was still severely rationed, and in 1948 even 
bread and potatoes were rationed . . . .”) . 
154. See, e.g., Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism
and Freud’s Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 817, 817, 826 (1986) (observing
that legal liberals posit “that law is both autonomous from politics and essential to the
moral progress of civilization,” and that “[i]n secular, Blackstonian terms, the law prohibits
not what ought rationally to be deterred or what is inefficient, but what is morally wrong”). 
West also contends that “[t]he legal positivist insists that the morality of a norm is
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of its legality.  The legality of a norm is solely a
function of social facts and carries with it no moral implications.” Id. at 817 n.3. But see
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 97 (1986) (“Law is . . . different from justice.  Justice is a 
matter of the correct or best theory of moral and political rights, and anyone’s conception of
justice is his theory, imposed by his own personal convictions, of what these rights 
actually are.  Law is a matter of which supposed rights supply a justification for using or 
withholding the collective force of the state because they are included in or implied by
actual political decisions . . . .”), cited in Kenneth Einar Himma, Situating Dworkin: The
Logical Space Between Legal Positivism and Natural Law Theory, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 41 (2002); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181–82 (Oxford Univ. Press 1982) 
(1961) (describing the so-called separability thesis as the “simple contention that it is in no
sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in
fact they have often done so”).
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detective hero.155 It is through the hard-boiled hero that these norms are
affirmed.156 
As with other aspects of law dealt with above, spy fiction expresses 
a deep cynicism about this aspect of law, a cynicism succinctly
captured in the iconic epithet “licensed to kill” that is associated with
James Bond.157  The oxymoronic juxtaposition of a term signifying
formal legality or validity—licensed—with the clearest cross-cultural
moral prohibition—to kill—offers a jarring satire of this critical function
of law.158 
With this sobriquet, Fleming’s Bond represents a fantasy of the individual
freed from the constraints of law, the “spy” who has extraordinary
155. See, e.g., KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 113 (describing the private eye of this era as 
one who “always decides to continue with his inquiries, to satisfy himself and some
personal sense of justice,” and who “is not, in the crucial part of the story, an employee: 
his time, his courage, above all his values, are controlled by himself”).  As George Grella
explains: 
Like the lonely man of the forests, [the hard-boiled detective] works outside
the established social code, preferring his own instinctive justice to the often
tarnished justice of civilization.  The private detective always finds the police
incompetent, brutal, or corrupt, and therefore works alone. . . .  Finding the 
social contract vicious and debilitating, he generally isolates himself from normal 
human relationships.  His characteristic toughness and his redeeming moral strength 
conflict with the values of his civilization and cause him, like Natty Bumppo 
or Huckleberry Finn, to flee the society which menaces his personal integrity
and spiritual freedom. 
Grella, supra note 117, at 106 (footnote omitted). 
156. See, e.g., Grella, supra note 117, at 108 (quoting Philip Marlowe, Raymond
Chandler’s character in The Long Goodbye, as saying, “I’ve got a five-thousand dollar
bill in my safe but I’ll never spend a nickel of it.  Because there was something wrong 
with the way I got it”).
157. See FLEMING, supra note 14, at 003 (“As a secret agent who held the rare double-O 
prefix—the license to kill in the Secret Service—it was his duty to be as cool about death
as a surgeon.”).
158. The moral prohibition “thou shalt not kill” is the substance of one of the Ten 
Commandments. See Exodus 20:13 (“You shall not murder.”).  It has also been a taboo
in every culture of every age.  See, e.g., West, supra note 154, at 825 n.32 (“When
civilization laid down the commandment that a man shall not kill the neighbour whom 
he hates . . . this was clearly done in the interest of man’s communal existence, which 
would not otherwise be practicable.  For the murderer would draw down on himself the 
vengeance of the murdered man’s kinsmen and the secret envy of others, who within
themselves feel as much inclined as he does for such acts of violence. . . .  Insecurity of
life, which is an equal danger for everyone, now unites men into a society which 
prohibits the individual from killing and reserves to itself the right to communal killing 
of anyone who violates the prohibition.  Here, then, we have justice and punishment.” 
(quoting SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION 51–52 (James Strachey ed. &
trans., 1961)).
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access to hedonistic and consumerist pleasures as a corollary of his 
liberation.  But this figure must operate in the realm of fantasy because
no individual can actually be “licensed to kill.”  The idea of such a
lawless privilege is both destabilizing and terrifying, implying as it does 
that there might well be others acting lawlessly, even murderously, to 
achieve their own political or corrupt aims.159  When a James Bond is
“licensed to kill,” law has thereby been severed from morality and 
ceases to have any moral authority. 
Similarly, le Carré’s novel,The Spy Who Came in from the Cold, presents a 
moral and legal world so topsy-turvy that his protagonist chooses
death rather than a return to its confines and betrayals.160  Executions, 
of both the guilty and the innocent, are allowed.  Lies are acceptable
because they advance the political agenda of the home state.  In both
writers’ imaginations, it appears that law has lost any moral authority
and become, at best, a joke and, at worst, a nightmare.
In the course of his narrative, le Carré paints a picture of the
moral inversion that law facilitates.  Beginning with a stark moral 
clarity—East Germany’s intelligence agents, the “bad guys,” have
killed all the British agents in East Berlin, the “good guys,” and the
good guys must avenge the wrong—le Carré sets the reader upon a path
of increasing confusion and accompanying uncertainty. In the novel’s
opening pages, Leamas is sure that Mundt has killed his agents or had 
them killed, and he is sure that Control wishes to punish Mundt by
159. The occasional scandal involving American or other governmentally
sanctioned killings is generally fueled by public horror at such lawlessness.  See, e.g., 
Former Argentine Navy Officer To Be Tried in Torture Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
2010, at A13 (reporting on the trial of a Navy captain “accused of playing a crucial role 
in the efforts of the 1976-83 military junta to eliminate leftist dissidents and suspected
sympathizers”); Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, After 9/11, C.I.A. Had Plan To Kill 
Qaeda’s Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at A1 (reporting that Secretary of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Leon Panetta cancelled a program “to dispatch small teams overseas
to kill senior Qaeda terrorists, according to current and former government officials,”
and that questions had arisen throughout the program’s existence under President Bush, 
including whether “such activities violate international law or American restrictions on
assassinations overseas”); Mark Mazzetti, Outsiders Hired as C.I.A. Planned To Kill
Jihadists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2009, at A1 (“The Central Intelligence Agency in 2004 
hired outside contractors from the private security contractor Blackwater USA as part of
a secret program to locate and assassinate top operatives of Al Qaeda, according to 
current and former government officials.”); Michael Slackman, Experts Say Iran Uses 
Death Penalty as a Way To Intimidate the Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009, at A6
(“A flurry of executions and death sentences in Iran has raised concern that the 
government is using judicially sanctioned killing to intimidate the political opposition 
and quell pockets of ethnic unrest around the nation, human rights groups and Iran 
experts said.”). 
160. See LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 212. 
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assigning Leamas the task of killing him.161 He takes on the mission
with all its dangers and personal costs, only to find that Control has 
used and betrayed him, and that the real object of the mission is to provide
Mundt with an impenetrable cover so that he can continue to act as a
double agent, feeding intelligence to Control.162 
The British, not the East Germans, then, are the ultimate utilitarians, 
calculating the value of the lives of several people, both British and East
German, and concluding that the loss of Mundt as a data source
outweighs them all.163  By Control’s own measure, Mundt is “a very
distasteful man.  Ex-Hitler-Youth and all that kind of thing.  Not at all an
intellectual kind of Communist.  A practitioner of the cold war.”164 
Nevertheless, Control privileges Mundt’s life against that of Fiedler, 
whose only moral flaw, if any, is to resent Mundt’s brutality, duplicity,
and flagrant anti-Semitism. 
Leamas is forced to realize this calculus in the course of the trial of
Mundt, and it is he who, in response to Liz’s baffled questions, explains
just how completely the roles of good and evil have been interpolated:
We are witnessing the lousy end to a filthy, lousy operation to save Mundt’s 
skin.  To save him from a clever little Jew in his own department who had begun to
suspect the truth.  They made us kill him, d’you see, kill the Jew. Now you know, 
and God help us both.165 
This realization represents a significant extension beyond the premise 
of moral equivalence that Control had asked Leamas to accept and 
acknowledge at the start of the mission.166 Along the way, law’s capacity 
161. As Control puts it, “[Mundt is] a killer. . . .  He tried to kill George Smiley.
And of course he shot the woman’s husband [in an earlier novel, A Call for the Dead].
He is a very distasteful man.  Ex Hitler-Youth and all that kind of thing.  Not at all an 
intellectual kind of Communist.  A practitioner of the cold war.” Id. at 16. 
162. On the eve of what he understands will be a show trial of Mundt, Leamas falls 
asleep “content in the knowledge Fiedler was his ally and that they would shortly send
Mundt to his death.”  Id. at 150. 
163. See id. at 203 (“Mundt is their man; he gives them what they need.”); see also
Most, supra note 13, at 362 (“Le Carré’s novel implicitly asks the question whether
English society has not reached the point at which truth must be suppressed and justice
thwarted if the society is to be preserved.”).
 164. LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 16. 
165. Id. at 199. 
166. See id. at 15 (“‘I would say that since the war, our methods—ours and those of
the opposition—have become much the same.  I mean you can’t be less ruthless than the 
opposition simply because your government’s policy is benevolent, can you now?’  He
laughed quietly to himself: ‘That would never do,’ he said.”). 
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to express moral norms has itself suffered a mortal blow.  Liz—who
stands for the reader in her innocence and optimism—witnesses its 
demise and expresses naïve astonishment that law does not appear to
stand for something immutable and good, shouting at Leamas: 
“How can you turn the world upside down? . . .  Fiedler was kind and decent; he
was only doing his job, and now you’ve killed him.  Mundt is a spy and a traitor
and you protect him.  Mundt is a Nazi, do you know that? He hates Jews . . .
what side are you on?  How can you . . . ?”167 
Leamas’s unsatisfying rejoinder, a programmatic explication of the 
necessary immorality of espionage, convinces no one, including Leamas
himself:
“There’s only one law in this game,” Leamas retorted.  “Mundt is their man; he
gives them what they need.  That’s easy enough to understand, isn’t it?
Leninism—the expediency of temporary alliances. What do you think spies are: 
priests, saints and martyrs?  They’re a squalid procession of vain fools, traitors
too, yes; pansies, sadists and drunkards, people who play cowboys and Indians
to brighten their rotten lives.  Do you think they sit like monks in London
balancing the rights and wrongs?  I’d have killed Mundt if I could, I hate his guts;
but not now.  It so happens that they need him.  They need him so that the great 
moronic mass that you admire can sleep soundly in their beds at night.  They
need him for the safety of ordinary, crummy people like you and me.”168 
Questions about identity and knowledge that are set out in Part II of
this paper surface again in considering this aspect of law, and they are
inextricably linked to the capacity of law to function as a
meaningful embodiment of moral norms. When an individual, like 
Leamas or Bond, is asked to abandon his true identity and to perform a 
false one, as Leamas does in his mission, acting the role of a drunk and 
dissolute loner who is disaffected from his British masters, le Carré 
suggests that he might thereby lose his own moral agency and the
capacity to judge and implement a satisfying morality.169  This depiction
of identity as performance reveals the subjectivity of morality, and the
risk of loss of moral agency when an individual willingly becomes 
subsumed by his performed identity.  The ethical ambiguities that might 
be insignificant to the removed or transcendent self prove to be both real 
and problematic to the performed self in particular situations.  So
167. Id. at 203.  Liz’s aposiopeses themselves underscore her profound confusion 
and inability to comprehend the moral world in which she finds herself. 
168. Id. at 203–04. 
169. See MONAGHAN, supra note 108, at 81–82 (speaking of the spy Verloc in 
Conrad’s The Secret Agent, he says, “With the sacrifice of his ability to feel, a man such 
as Verloc also loses his sense of identity,” especially when contrasted with the idiot 
Stevie, recruited by Verloc to wear the destructive device, who “signifies pure feeling”;
“through Stevie . . . Conrad asserts that feeling is the basis of all knowledge”). 
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Leamas finds himself detachedly acting the part of the defector, only to 
be confronted by Liz and her love for him, whereupon he is forced to 
abandon his role.170  But by then it is too late: Leamas’s prolonged 
performance has stripped him of the power to control the outcome or
even to protect Liz: 
    Suddenly the whole world seemed to break into flame; from everywhere, from
above and beside them, massive lights converged, bursting upon them with
savage accuracy. 
Leamas was blinded, he turned his head away, wrenching wildly at Liz’s arm.
Now she was swinging free; he thought she had slipped and he called frantically, 
still drawing her upwards.  He could see nothing—only a mad confusion of
colour dancing in his eyes. 
Then came the hysterical wail of sirens, orders frantically shouted. Half
kneeling astride the wall he grasped both her arms in his, and began dragging
her to him inch by inch, himself on the verge of falling.
Then they fired—single rounds, three or four, and he felt her shudder.  Her
thin arms slipped from his hands.171 
In this way, errors about identity spill into other areas of law’s concern; if
identity cannot be reliably known, then the utility of law as an expression of
the moral attitudes of a community is greatly diminished. The instability
of identity is thereby equated with amorality.172 
The ultimate act of illegality, in moral ethical terms, is that Leamas is 
stripped of his own autonomy and used as an instrument in an
assassination that is the inverse of his own freely chosen end.173  Leamas
is used by Control to assassinate Fiedler because Fiedler is “just” in two 
respects: he is accurate in his suspicions of Mundt’s disloyalty, and he is 
also steadfastly loyal to his own state and its values as against the
West.174  Mundt is permitted to kill Fiedler as a state-sponsored act by a
state to which he himself is a traitor and to do so through the agency of
Leamas, a now fully dehumanized actor, because it serves Control’s 
interest.  In this way, le Carré underscores the degradation of morality, 
170. See LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 175 (describing Leamas’s outburst when Liz 
is brought before the Tribunal). 
171. Id. at 211. 
172. See, e.g., LUDLUM, supra note 48 (establishing the fictional premise that the
C.I.A. has chosen to erase the identity of its agent in order to free him of moral accountability
or remorse, so that he can act as an assassin).
173. That end had been to kill Mundt and thereby to save Fiedler from Mundt’s
anti-Semitic brutality, based upon Leamas’s understanding of Mundt’s moral worth.
174. In his Jewish identity, Fiedler also represents the other/outsider/vulnerable victim
as against the abuse of power by Mundt. 
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and of and as repository of moral values, that is the result of incremental 
instrumentalism.175  
VI. CONCLUSION
In their fictional representations of espionage, le Carré and Fleming 
pose a series of questions for the reader, each question relating to
fundamental aspects of law.  Are there any rules when states are 
ideologically opposed?  What distinguishes the good from the bad state 
or the good from the bad individual?  Doubt about the righteousness of
the state actor in these novels generates either escapist pleasure or deep 
anxiety.  The familiar catchphrase “James Bond, licensed to kill,” in this 
reading, becomes a reductive critique of law.
175. Le Carré also depicts the human response to this revelation of the immorality
of law: a profound hopelessness seizes Leamas upon his realization that there is no
fundamental guiding principal of right.  He writes: 
Shielding his eyes he looked down at the foot of the wall and at last he
managed to see her, lying still. For a moment he hesitated, then quite slowly
he climbed back down the same rungs, until he was standing beside her.  She 
was dead; her face was turned away, her black hair drawn across her cheek as 
if to protect her from the rain. 
LE CARRÉ, supra note 14, at 212. 
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